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Section 164 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (the TAA), previously contained in 
section 88 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Income Tax Act) and section 36 of the 
Value-Added Tax (VAT) Act 89 of 1991 (the VAT Act), provides that the payment of tax 
will not be automatically suspended until the resolution of a dispute regarding the liability for 
the said tax debt. This is known as the ‘pay now argue later’ principle. The objectives of this 
research were to analyse the development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in South 
African tax law, to provide an overview of the content and operation of section 164 of the 
TAA, to compare the principle and its purpose with civil debt enforcement procedures and, 
lastly, to test the principle against the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution), specifically the right of access to courts. The underlying theme of this research 
is the recognition of taxpayers’ rights in South Africa, specifically the interplay between the 
powers of the fiscus and the rights of taxpayers.  
In order to achieve the abovementioned objectives, this research examined the 
development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle from its first appearance in section 88 of 
the Income Tax Act and section 36 of the VAT Act to its subsequent incorporation into the 
Tax Administration Bill 11 of 2011 and, ultimately, into section 164 of the TAA. It was 
concluded that the development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, from its first 
appearance in the Income Tax Act in 1962 and the VAT Act in 1993 until their repeal in 
2011, was relatively minor save for in 2009, during which year there was a marked change in 
the structure of this principle with the inclusion of the so-called ‘suspension rule’. This 
research provided a practical overview and understanding of the operation of the ‘pay now 
argue later’ principle in terms of section 164 of the TAA, specifically focusing on the 
suspension rule. This research further compared the ‘pay now argue later’ principle with civil 
debt enforcement procedures, specifically provisional sentence and summary judgment. It 
was concluded that the ‘pay now argue later’ principle is an exception to the ordinary rules 
governing civil debt enforcement proceedings. Lastly, this research placed the ‘pay now 
argue later’ principle under constitutional scrutiny, specifically whether its application 
infringes on the right of access to courts of taxpayers. It was found that the ‘pay now argue 
later’ principle infringes a taxpayer’s right of access to courts, but this limitation is justified 
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GLOSSARY AND LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Abbreviation or term  Explanations 
 
the Bill of Rights Chapter 2 of the Constitution  
 
the Constitution The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
the Commissioner The Commissioner for SARS appointed under section 6 of the 
SARS Act, currently Mr Tom Moyane 
 
the common law South African common law is founded on Roman-Dutch law 
  
the fiscus This term is used to refer to the South African National 
Treasury, including SARS 
 
Income tax Direct tax on income or remuneration 
 
the Income Tax Act The Income Tax Act 56 of 1962 
 
the Interim Constitution The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 
 
PAJA The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
 
prima facie ‘At first sight’ or ‘on first appearance but subject to further 
evidence or information’1 
 
a Public Notice Notices issued in terms of the TAA  
 
SARS The South African Revenue Service, previously known as the 
Inland Revenue 
 
the SARS Act South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 
 
                                                 
1 Black’s Law Dictionary 8 ed (2004) at the definition of ‘prima facie’.  
xi 
 
the TAA The Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011.  
 
the TAB The Tax Administration Bill 11 of 2011  
 
a tax Act A ‘tax Act’ is defined in section 1 of the TAA as including the 
TAA and any Act referred to in section 4 of the SARS Act, 
excluding customs and excise legislation. Section 4 of the SARS 
Act refers to Schedule 1 to the SARS Act, which, in turn, lists 
the various tax Acts. 
 
the tax board The tax board is established by the Minister of Finance under 
section 108 of the TAA. It is not a court as referred to in section 
166 of the Constitution, but an administrative tribunal created 
under the TAA. The Tax Board hears tax appeals involving tax 
in dispute that do not exceed the amount determined by the 
Minister under section 109(1)(a) of the TAA, which is, in 
respect of any appeals noted on or after 1 January 2016 R1 
million.2  
 
the tax court The tax court is established by the President of the Republic 
under section 116 of the TAA. It is not a court as referred to in 
section 166 of the Constitution, but an administrative tribunal 
created under the TAA. The tax court has jurisdiction over tax 
appeals lodged under section 103 of the TAA and may also hear 
interlocutory applications and procedural matters relating to 
objections and appeals. 
 
the Uniform Rules of 
Court 
Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Several 
Provincial and Local Divisions of the High Court of South 
Africa. 
 
the VAT Act The Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 
 
VAT VAT is an indirect tax on the consumption of goods and services 
in the economy. 
 
                                                 






1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The reality is that we don’t pay 
taxes. The government takes 
them.3 
  In a perfect world SARS would 
not need efficient revenue 
collection and enforcement 
procedures as taxpayers would 
voluntary [sic] pay their fair share 
of the tax burden.4 
 
 An exordium to the research 
 
The above epigraph serves as an illustration of the divide in thinking regarding fiscal debt 
recovery. In conducting this research the sharpness of this divide became strikingly apparent.5 
There is definite thinking among the global taxpaying community that taxing authorities have 
a power of tax enforcement and collection that borders on ‘legalized [sic] robbery’6. 
However, as any logistician would argue, ‘[i]n a perfect world SARS [or any taxing 
authority] would not need efficient revenue collection and enforcement procedures as 
taxpayers would voluntary [sic] pay their fair share of the tax burden’7. This contrasted 
thinking speaks to the juxtaposed development, both in South Africa and in international 
jurisdictions, of increasing powers for taxing authorities, specifically the powers of tax 
collection and access to information in the furtherance of such collection, accompanied by 
increasing acknowledgement and awareness of taxpayers’ rights by both taxpayers 
themselves and the taxing authorities. Perhaps, however, in a legalised society, there can 
never be development of the one without the other.  
It is submitted that the procedure that is the point of departure for fiscal debt 
enforcement and collection procedures in South African tax law is the so-called ‘pay now 
argue later’ principle. This principle, as the phrase suggests, denotes paying first and only 
arguing about it later. It is a colloquial phrase used to refer to the fiscal debt enforcement 
procedure provided for under section 164 of the TAA, a section labelled Payment of tax 
pending objection or appeal, which, in turn, falls under Chapter 10 Tax Liability and 
                                                 
3 C Rock Rock This! (2000). 
4 L Olivier ‘Uncertainty regarding the philosophy underlying South African Revenue Service collection procedures’ (2003) 2 
Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 382-8 at page 382. 
5 It is not disputed, however, that both thinking may simultaneously be adopted.  
6 C Coolidge cited in TM Block Happy Returns: The Story of Henry Block, America’s Tax Man (2010) at page 153.  
7 Olivier op cit note 4 at page 382. 
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Payment, specifically Part B Payment of Tax of the TAA. Section 164 (previously section 88 
of the Income Tax Act and section 36 of the VAT Act) specifically states that ‘the obligation 
to pay tax… and the right of SARS to receive and recover tax… will not be suspended by an 
objection or an appeal… ’.8 A taxpayer will, instead, be required, by law, to first pay a tax 
debt due9, unless SARS agrees to suspend the obligation to pay the tax debt in terms of 
section 164(2), the so-called ‘suspension rule’, and only later argue the liability therefor. In 
the event that a taxpayer does decide to argue later, the onus of proof rests on the taxpayer to 
prove, inter alia, ‘that an amount, transaction, event or item is exempt or otherwise not 
taxable’.10  
As a crude simplification, the fiscus is a creditor and every South African taxpayer is 
a debtor for the amount of tax due in respect of that taxpayer. There are fundamental 
differences between debt enforcement in the civil arena versus that in public administration, 
the former regulated by procedural law, which controls interactions between civil persons and 
concerns ‘[t]he rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced’11, 
and the latter being regulated by administrative law, which is ‘[t]he law governing the 
organization [sic] and operation of administrative agencies’12 which, it is submitted, includes 
the fiscus. It is contended that, despite this difference, a comparison between fiscal debt 
enforcement and civil debt13 enforcement is still possible and necessary on the premise that 
‘[o]nce the Commissioner is a creditor, he is entitled to whatever remedy a creditor may have 
for the enforcement or collection of the debt’, which includes civil debt enforcement 
procedures.14 SARS’ power to ‘receive and recover tax’ is a monetary claim and such 
monetary claims are also, in principle, susceptible to civil debt enforcement procedures. The 
‘pay now argue later’ principle is an exception to ordinary civil debt enforcement in that it 
does not involve court process, which is characteristic of ordinary civil debt enforcement 
whereby litigation is the procedural step by which a creditor enforces the payment of a civil 
debt due, but instead occurs automatically by operation of law. There are exceptions to 
ordinary civil debt enforcement, namely provisional sentence15 and summary judgment16.  
The ‘pay now argue later’ principle is a provision in tax administrative law which 
protects the power of SARS to ‘receive and recover tax’. However, it may be argued that the 
                                                 
8 Section 164(1) of the TAA. 
9 A tax debt due to the fiscus is defined in terms of section 169(1) of the TAA which states that it is ‘[a]n amount of tax due 
or payable in terms of a tax Act’. According to section 170 of the TAA a tax debt is recorded by way of an ‘assessment’, 
which is defined in section 1 of the TAA as ‘the determination of the amount of a tax liability or refund, by way of self-
assessment or assessment by SARS’. 
10 Section 102(1)(a) of the TAA. 
11 Black’s Law Dictionary op cit note 1 at the definition of ‘procedural law’.  
12 Ibid at the definition of ‘administrative law’.  
13 Throughout this research reference to civil debt is limited to refer to a civil contractual debt.  
14 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Hawker Air Services (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner for South African 
Revenue Service v Hawker Aviation Services Partnership and Others 2006 (4) SA 292 (SCA) at para 17. 
15 The provisional sentence procedure is regulated by the common law and Rule 8(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court and 
Rule 14A Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Magistrates’ Courts of South Africa. 
16 The summary judgment procedure is regulated by the common law and Rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court and Rule 
14 of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Magistrates’ Courts of South Africa. 
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extent of this protection is so that it places this power in preference of a taxpayer’s 
constitutional right of access to courts17. In this regard, the ‘pay now argue later’ principle 
has been labelled a ‘draconian’18 procedure and one which infringes taxpayers’ rights, 
however, at the same time it consistently satisfies constitutional scrutiny with regard to its 
consistency with the right of access to courts19. This further illustrates the paradoxes in 
thinking and development referred to above.  
The intention of this research is to expand on existing analyses of the ‘pay now argue 
later’ principle by testing its consistency with the Constitution, as well as to compare it 
against broader debt enforcement in civil procedure. Although the principle has been tested 
against the Constitution both in a judicial arena, as well as an academic one20, comparisons 
with broader debt enforcement in civil procedure are not common. In the case of Twee Jonge 
Gezellen (Pty) Ltd and Another v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa 
t/a The Land Bank and Another21, where the Constitutional Court decided on whether the 
provisional sentence procedure unjustifiably limits the right of access to courts, Brand AJ 
made brief mention to an argument raised by the respondent that ‘a comparison between 
provisional sentence and other procedures that were held to pass constitutional muster or that 
were at least not as yet subjected to constitutional challenge’ should be made, the respondent 
referring specifically to, inter alia, the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, the provisional 
sentence and summary judgment procedures.22 Brand AJ however held that ‘[t]he 
constitutionality of each procedure… must be considered separately if and when it is 
necessary’ and thus held that a comparison of such a nature would not be helpful.23 This 
research does not focus soley on a comparison of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle with the 
provisional sentence and summary judgment procedures in order to determine the 
constitutionality of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, but more as means of showing that the 
‘pay now argue later’ principle is not a peculiarity in broader debt enforcement in South 
Africa. This research will expand on the ‘pay now argue later’ principle and will ask and then 
answer questions about its development, operation, comparability with civil debt procedures 
and consistency with the Constitution.  
 
                                                 
17 Section 34 of the Constitution.  
18 R C Williams ‘The pay-now-argue-later rule festers in our income tax system’ South African Institute of Tax Professionals 
Technical 2 December 2011, available at <http://www.thesait.org.za/news/78404/The-pay-now-argue-later-rule-festers-in-
our-income-tax-system-Mobibane-case.htm>. 
19 For example, see Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another 2001 (1) SA 1109 
(CC) in which case the Constitutional Court held that section 36 of the VAT did not unjustifiably limit a taxpayer’s right of 
access to courts in terms of section 34 of the Constitution. 
20 C Keulder ‘“Pay now, argue later” rule: before and after the Tax Administration Act’ (2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 125-158; C Keulder Does the constitution protect taxpayers against the mighty SARS? An inquiry into the 
constitutionality of selected tax practices and procedures (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Pretoria, 2012). The 
former research focuses primarily on the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in terms of section 36 of the VAT Act, while the 
latter compared, inter alia, the process of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle with the civil procedure regulating appeals. 
21 2011 (3) SA 1 (CC). 
22 Ibid at para 62. 
23 Ibid at para 63. 
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 The focus and objectives of the research 
 
The focus of this research is on the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in South African law of 
taxation and in light of various questions, which are set out in Diagram 1 below. This 
research addresses questions on how the ‘pay now argue later’ principle developed and how 
it, with the inclusion of the suspension rule, operates in South Africa. This research further 
asks and answers questions on the comparison of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle to South 
African civil debt enforcement procedures and on whether it justifiably infringes a taxpayer’s 
right of access to courts. All of these areas of focus are important to a thorough analysis of 
the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in South African tax law. 
 
Diagram 1: An outline of the specific research questions focused on in this research  
Development of 
the ‘pay now argue 
later’ principle 
X How has the ‘pay now argue later’ principle developed from its first 
appearance in the Income Tax Act and the VAT Act to the TAB and, finally, 
to the TAA, and what was the nature of the developments? 
Y What was the effect, if any, of the advent of the Constitutional era on the 
development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle?  
Operation and 
content of section 
164 of the TAA 
Z How is an application to suspend the obligation to pay tax brought by a 
taxpayer in terms of the TAA? 
[ What is the meaning and scope of the Commissioner’s ‘discretion’ when 
approving or refusing an application for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue 
later’ principle?  
\ What, if any, are the remedies available to a taxpayer whose application 
for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle has been refused and 
are they sufficient? 
Comparison to 
South African civil 
debt enforcement 
procedures 
] How does the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, as a fiscal debt enforcement 
procedure, compare with ordinary civil debt enforcement in South Africa? 
^ Is the rationale underlying the ‘pay now argue later’ principle consistent 
with exceptions to ordinary civil debt enforcement in South Africa, that is 
provisional sentence and summary judgment? 
Consistency with 
the Constitution 
_ Are the provisions of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle consistent with 
the constitutional right of access to courts; if not, then is a limitation on the 
constitutional right of access to courts justified?  
` Should the ‘pay now argue later’ principle have different applications for 





Following the above, there are four predominant research objectives. First, the 
research aims to analyse the development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle under the 
now repealed section 88 of the Income Tax Act and section 36 of the VAT Act into a 
combination of both under the TAB which later became the TAA. The aim of this is to show 
how and in what manner this principle developed and provide insight into the nature of the 
developments. Secondly, the research aims to provide a basic understanding of the ‘pay now 
argue later’ principle in terms of section 164 of the TAA and to clarify the abovementioned 
questions regarding the operation of the principle with the inclusion of the suspension rule. 
Thirdly, the research aims to analyse the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in terms of broader 
civil debt enforcement procedures in South Africa, as well as to specifically compare the 
principle with provisional sentence and summary judgment procedures which operate as 
exceptions to the ordinary South African civil debt enforcement procedure. Fourthly, the 
research aims to test the principle against the Constitution, specifically the right of access to 
courts, in order to determine whether this principle unjustifiably restricts a taxpayer’s right of 
access to courts, taking into account that a different procedure for VAT and income tax may 
be warranted.  
 
 An overview of the research 
 
The literature review conducted in preparation for this research concentrated on finding 
answers to the questions posed in Diagram 1. The primary purpose of this subsection is to 
broadly outline the sources used to answer these questions.  
How has the ‘pay now argue later’ principle developed from its first appearance in 
the Income Tax Act and the VAT Act to the TAB and, finally, to the TAA, and what was 
the nature of the developments? This research question was answered with reference to the 
legislated amendments in the Amendment Acts24 relevant to the Income Tax Act, the VAT 
Act and the TAA (which followed the TAB). In order to obtain a greater understanding of the 
nature of these amendments, that is the reason and effect of the different amendments, the 
memoranda of objects and explanatory memoranda25 which accompanied the TAB, as well as 
the Amendment Bills, were used. The abovementioned memoranda were, however, not 
always a useful source of information, as the explanations provided therein were not always 
consistent with the actual amendment in the Amendment Act or the TAB.  
                                                 
24 Amendment Acts are promulgated in order to amend Principal Acts, such as the Income Tax Act, VAT Act, and TAA. 
Amendment Bills are their predecessors, intended to invite public comment in the process of drafting the amending 
legislation. 
25 Memoranda of objects accompany administration Bills (section 76 of the Constitution) and explanatory memoranda 
accompany money Bills (section 77 of the Constitution). According to SARS’ website the above memoranda ‘provide 
background on proposed new legislation, reasons for proposed changes to existing legislation and further explanations or 




What was the effect, if any, of the advent of the Constitutional era on the 
development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle? Again the legislated amendments in the 
Amendment Acts relevant to the Income Tax Act, the VAT Act and the TAA (which 
followed the TAB) were used to answer this research question. The abovementioned 
memoranda were also partially relied on where helpful. The research conducted in answering 
this research question assisted in determining whether the amendments to the ‘pay now argue 
later’ principle were in line with the increasing focus, both nationally and internationally, on 
taxpayers’ rights, that is, whether the amendments provided greater scope for taxpayers’ 
rights or whether they limited such rights. With the advent of the Interim Constitution, an ex 
parte application was brought in 1996 by the then Commissioner: Inland Revenue, Trevor 
Frederik van Heerden, for direct access to the Constitutional Court, to bring an application for 
the Constitutional Court to conduct an inquiry into the constitutionality of section 88 of the 
Income Tax Act, as well as other sections of the Income Tax Act.26 The affidavit of van 
Heerden, which was used in support of the application, as well as the Brief for the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Republic of South Africa drafted by Brian J Arnold 
in 1995 which was annexed to the affidavit as Annexure “H”, were both served as useful 
contributions throughout this research.  
How is an application to suspend the obligation to pay tax brought by a taxpayer in 
terms of the TAA? Practical experience in drafting these applications was used in order to 
answer this research question.  
What is the meaning and scope of the Commissioner’s ‘discretion’ when approving 
or refusing an application for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle? In 
answering this research question, the legislation itself was considered, specifically section 
164(2) and (3) of the TAA, as well as commentary thereon by Croome and Olivier.27 Section 
164(2) gives effect to the power of a senior SARS official to suspend a taxpayer’s obligation 
to pay tax upon an application being filed by such taxpayer and section 164(3) outlines the 
factors that a senior SARS official may have regard to when deciding whether to accept such 
an application for the suspension of the obligation to pay tax. Practical experience in drafting 
these applications was also used in answering this research question.  
What, if any, are the remedies available to a taxpayer whose application for the 
suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle has been refused and are they sufficient? 
Judicial review in terms of PAJA was the focus in answering this research question, as it is 
the only form of relief in a situation where an application for the suspension of the ‘pay now 
argue later’ principle has been refused. Reference was also made to Croome and Olivier and 
their work together and separately on taxpayers’ rights and tax collection.28  
                                                 
26 Ex parte: The Commissioner for Inland Revenue (unreported case no CCT/22/1996) of 25 April 1996. 
27 Please see Chapter 2 for references of these works.  
28 Please see Chapter 4 for references of these works.  
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How does the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, as a fiscal debt enforcement 
procedure, compare with ordinary civil debt enforcement in South Africa? The answer of 
this question turned on the difference between the nature of a civil debt versus that of a fiscal 
debt. This comparison was therefore considered in answering this research question, using the 
fiscal legislation which gives effect to a fiscal debt and authority on the common law which 
gives effect to a civil contractual debt.  
Is the rationale underlying the ‘pay now argue later’ principle consistent with 
exceptions to ordinary civil debt enforcement in South Africa, that is provisional sentence 
and summary judgment? In answering this research question, principal case law dealing with 
the provisional sentence and summary judgment was used, supplemented by commentary 
from other sources on the purpose for each procedure. For the purposes of this research only 
a brief outline of provisional sentence and summary judgment was required in order to 
compare them with the ‘pay now argue later’ principle on certain key areas. 
Are the provisions of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle consistent with the 
constitutional right of access to courts; if not, then is a limitation on the constitutional 
right of access to courts justified? In answering this research question, principal case law 
dealing with the provisional sentence and summary judgment procedures was used, 
supplemented by commentary from other sources. 
Should the ‘pay now argue later’ principle have different applications for VAT and 
income tax disputes? Kriegler JA’s interpretation of the difference between VAT and income 
tax in Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and 
Another29, in which the Constitutional Court decided on whether section 36 of the VAT Act 
unjustifiably limited the right of access to courts, was the primary source used for answering 
this research question, supplemented by commentary on this distinction, or lack of 
distinction, from other sources. 
  
                                                 






2. CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ‘PAY NOW ARGUE 
LATER’ PRINCIPLE WITHIN SOUTH AFRICAN TAX LAW 
 
 
[T]he law is never static; it is always changing, being reinterpreted or 
redefined, as legislators and judges strive, with varying degrees of success, to 




The ‘pay now argue later’ principle should, in theory, have developed as a consequence to 
and in order to reflect the ‘changes in society’31 had it not already been consistent with them. 
This principle originally came into effect in 1962 in terms of the Income Tax Act and later, in 
1991, in terms of the VAT Act. In 2011, these provisions were repealed by the TAA 
subsequent to their incorporation in the TAB, which later became the TAA.  
The major changes or developments in the South African society can be characterised 
by the advent of the Constitution in 199432 and the increasing awareness of taxpayers’ rights 
and powers of taxing authorities, both nationally and internationally. In principle ‘[r]evenue 
laws [were]… no exception’ to the overhaul that the Constitution effected on the legal system 
of South Africa.33 As previously mentioned, in 1996, the then Commissioner: Inland 
Revenue, van Heerden, applied, ex parte, for direct access to the Constitutional Court to bring 
an application for the Constitutional Court to conduct an inquiry into the constitutionality of 
section 88 of the Income Tax Act, as well as other sections of the Income Tax Act.34 Because 
of the similarity between the Income Tax Act and the VAT Act, it was thought unnecessary 
to bring corresponding VAT provisions under Constitutional scrutiny, but to amend them in 
line with findings of the Constitutional Court, should the case be heard, on the impugned 
provisions in the Income Tax Act.35 This application arose because of the fear that ‘revenue 
collection might be seriously jeopardised if taxpayers refused to pay tax on the basis that 
certain revenue provisions were unconstitutional’36 and also, it is submitted, to prevent 
lengthy and costly disputes with taxpayers regarding the constitutionality of certain fiscal 
                                                 
30 P Harris An introduction to law 8 ed (2016) at pages 3-4.  
31 Ibid at page 4. 
32 The Interim Constitution, and later the Constitution.  
33 L Olivier ‘Tax collection and the Bill of Rights’ (2001) Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 193-200 at page 193. 
34 The Commissioner for Inland Revenue supra note 26. 
35 Olivier op cit note 33 at page 193. 
36 Ibid at page 193. 
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provisions. However, the application was never heard by the Constitutional Court on the 
basis that it was not appropriate for direct access.37 Regardless of this outcome, fiscal 
provisions, including the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, have still had opportunity to 
undergo constitutional scrutiny, although this has had little to no impact on the development 
of the principle.38  
As mentioned above, a further development in the South African society, as well as in 
the rest of the world, is the growing awareness and recognition of taxpayers’ rights. This is 
evidenced by the recommendation for a taxpayers’ charter by the Katz Commission39 and 
also Croome’s extensive research into taxpayers’ rights in South Africa, which has been 
influential in creating greater awareness of the rights of taxpayers in this country.40 A further 
illustration of this trend is Waris’ research on whether human rights can be used as a tool for 
citizens to evaluate fiscal allocations; in other words, whether ‘human rights law, principles 
and policies’ can be used ‘to link tax revenue to expenditure through re-distribution’.41  
There has also, as previously mentioned, been a converse development in both South 
Africa and the world; namely, the expansion of taxing authorities’ powers, specifically 
powers of access to information and tax collection. An example of this is that SARS is now 
entitled to request banks to furnish financial information about taxpayers.42 In terms of 
section 46(3) of the TAA SARS is permitted to secure information about a taxpayer from 
third parties, provided that the information gathered is ‘material maintained or kept or that 
should reasonably be maintained or kept by the person in respect to the taxpayer’. The 
definition of ‘relevant material’ in section 1 of the TAA gives SARS the discretion to 
determine what constitutes ‘relevant material’ for the purposes of the TAA. SARS is also 
entitled to instruct banks to transfer available funds from taxpayers’ bank accounts to SARS, 
without being permitted to inform their clients beforehand43.  
In the almost 55 years that have elapsed since its first appearance in the Income Tax 
Act, the development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle should, in principle, have 
mimicked these developments in South African society, had it not been consistent with them 




                                                 
37 Olivier op cit note 33 at page 193.  
38 Ibid at page 193.  
39 The Commission of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa (Katz Commission) which issued 
various reports under the Commissions Act 8 of 1947 and in accordance with Government Gazette 15924, Regulation 
Gazette 5378 of 1994. See specifically the Third Interim Report of the Katz Commission Chapter 12 at page 130. 
40 For example see B Croome Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa (2010).  
41 The work referred to is A Waris Tax and Development: Solving Kenya’s Fiscal Crisis through Human Rights (2013).  
42 This flows from the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and various bilateral 
treaties. South Africa has adopted these instruments in compliance with the Constitution and must adhere to them.  
43 Section 179 of the TAA. 
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 The development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle under section 88 of the 
Income Tax Act: 1962 to 2011 
 
The promulgation of the Income Tax Act in 1962 brought with it section 88, which, as it then 
stood44, compelled taxpayers to pay tax due by them regardless of any pending appeal made 
by them against the obligation to pay the tax due. Section 88 was, originally, only applicable 
to ‘tax chargeable’ under the Income Tax Act and only to situations which involved an 
‘appeal or pending the decision of a court of law’ under section 86 of the Income Tax Act, 
which dealt with appeals. Excluded from the applicability of section 88 were situations in 
which an objection to an obligation to pay tax was lodged by a taxpayer45. Ipso facto, only 
situations involving the lodging of an appeal would have resulted in the applicability of the 
‘pay now argue later’ principle in terms of section 88. By legal exclusion, ‘[t]he obligation to 
pay tax and the right to receive and recover any tax’ due by a taxpayer would have been 
suspended by the lodging of an objection against the liability for the tax due. The 
Commissioner was permitted to ‘direct’ that section 88 not apply. The circumstances in 
which the Commissioner could make such a direction or the factors which should have been 
considered in making such a direction were not elaborated on in the section. Furthermore, it 
was not clear whether an application had to be made by the taxpayer or whether it was purely 
the prerogative of the Commissioner to direct that the ‘pay now argue later’ principle not 
apply. Tax due to Inland Revenue was recoverable from a taxpayer ‘with interest chargeable 
from the due date’ of the tax until payment thereof. Tax paid in excess, that is, tax found not 
to be due but paid by a taxpayer in terms of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, was required 
to be refunded to such taxpayer ‘with interest from the date of the receipt’ of such tax by 
Inland Revenue.  
The majority of the amendments made to section 88, from its original form up to 
when it was repealed in 2011, concerned administrative and technical amendments such as 
the inclusion of provincial taxes to the scope of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle46; the 
alteration of the interest rate to be applied to excess tax paid by a taxpayer47; clarification 
regarding the funding to be used by SARS for paying interest on excess tax paid by a 
taxpayer48; and the inclusion of decisions or appeals by the special tax court and the special 
tax board to the scope of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle 49. There were, however, certain 
                                                 
44 See Diagram 2 which, inter alia, displays section 88 in its original form (prior to any amendments). 
45 In ‘Effect of lodging an objection on payment of tax’ (1964) 13-14 The Taxpayer 167-168 at 168 it was held that ‘payment 
of tax cannot be enforced pending the Secretary’s decision on an objection lodged timeously’. 
46 Section 12 of the Income Tax Amendment Act 6 of 1963 read with the Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax 
Amendment Bill, 1963.  
47 Section 44 of Act 85 of the Income Tax Act 85 of 1974 read with the Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill, 
1974; section 24 of the Income Tax Act 91 of 1982 read with the Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill, 1982.  
48 Section 14 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 140 of 1993 read with the Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue 
Laws Amendment Bill, 1993. 
49 Section 25 of the Income Tax Act 103 of 1976 read with the Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill, 1976; 
section 40 of the Income Tax Act 113 of 1993 read with the Income Tax Bill, 1993. 
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amendments to section 88 that warrant further discussion, the first of these being the 
amendment that took place in 1963.  
Section 12 of the Income Tax Act 6 of 1963, amended section 88 so as to require a 
taxpayer, for the purposes of calculating the interest due by SARS on excess tax paid by the 
taxpayer, to prove the date upon which SARS received the payment of the said excess tax. 
Such an amendment allowed for a more efficient approach than the one in terms of which 
SARS would be required to prove the date upon which it received the payment of such excess 
tax, as it is presumed that such proof is more easily obtainable by the respective taxpayer than 
by SARS. This amendment thus reduced the administrative burden on SARS.  
In 1989, section 17 of the Income Tax Act 70 of 1989 amended section 88 so as to 
oblige SARS to pay interest on excess tax paid by a taxpayer in circumstances where SARS 
conceded to an appeal prior to the outcome of the appeal.50 This amendment limited the 
extent to which SARS could frivolously enforce the ‘pay now argue later’ principle. Without 
this amendment SARS had the power to secure payment of tax due by the taxpayer only to 
later concede to an objection to the obligation to pay the tax by the taxpayer, all the while 
earning interest on the tax paid by the taxpayer.51  
In 2009, section 88 underwent a substantial restructuring, which was effected by 
section 13 of the Taxation Laws Second Amendment Act 18 of 2009. It is submitted that the 
most important amendment brought by section 13 was the suspension rule, which is still an 
integral part of section 164 of the TAA. The suspension rule, as effected by section 13, 
provided a mechanism by which a taxpayer could apply to the Commissioner that the ‘pay 
now argue later’ rule be suspended. Factors that the Commissioner may have taken into 
account when considering whether to accept or refuse an application for the suspension of the 
‘pay now argue later’ principle were also outlined. Section 13 further provided for ‘interest 
where a payment [of tax] is made pending [the] consideration of an objection that is 
ultimately allowed’.52  
Diagram 2 below outlines of the development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle 






                                                 
50 Section 17 of the Income Tax Act 70 of 1989 read with the Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill, 1989.  
51 It may be noted that in terms of the Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill, 1989 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
had held that ‘interest is payable to a taxpayer only if his appeal is actually heard and upheld by the court’. It appears, 
however, that SARS had adopted a practice of paying interest where the Commissioner decided to conceded an appeal prior 
to the court hearing, and therefore the amendment in section 17 of the Income Tax Act 70 of 1989 was made in fairness to 
the taxpayer. 
52 Memorandum on the Objects of the Taxation Laws Second Amendment Bill, 18 of 2009. 
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Diagram 2: The development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle under section 88 of the 
Income Tax Act: 1962 to 201153  
                                                 
53 The Amendment Acts read with the Explanatory Memoranda and the Memoranda on Objects relating to the amendments 







 The development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle under section 36 of the 
VAT Act: 1991 to 2011 
 
The promulgation of the VAT Act in 1991 brought with it section 36, a section similar in all 
material respects to section 88. Section 36, as it then stood54, compelled taxpayers to pay 
VAT due by them regardless of any pending appeal made by them against such obligation to 
pay the tax due. Section 36 was, originally, only applicable to ‘tax chargeable’ under the 
VAT Act and only to situations which involved an ‘appeal or pending the decision of a court 
of law’. Excluded from the applicability of section 36 were situations in which an objection 
to an obligation to pay tax was made by a taxpayer. Therefore, as with section 88, by 
exclusion in law, ‘[t]he obligation to pay tax and the right to receive and recover any tax’ due 
by a taxpayer would have been suspended by the lodging of an objection against the liability 
for the tax due. The Commissioner was permitted to ‘direct’ that section 36 not apply. The 
same confusion regarding the circumstances in which the Commissioner could make such a 
direction, or the factors which should have been considered in making such a direction, were 
present in section 36. It was, likewise, not clear whether an application had to be made by the 
taxpayer or whether it was purely the prerogative of the Commissioner to direct that the ‘pay 
now argue later’ principle should not apply. VAT due to Inland Revenue was recoverable 
from the relevant taxpayer with penalty and interest chargeable from the due date of the VAT 
due until payment thereof. VAT paid in excess, that is, VAT found not to be due but paid by 
the taxpayer in terms of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, was required to be refunded to 
the taxpayer with interest from the date of the receipt by Inland Revenue of such amount. The 
date upon which the excess tax was received by Inland Revenue had to be proved by the 
taxpayer ‘to the satisfaction of the Commissioner’. The ‘pay now argue later’ principles 
delineated in section 88 and section 36 were largely similar. This speaks to the approach in 
South Africa of treating income tax and VAT similarly in this respect, despite their 
fundamental differences as taxes.55  
A large number of the amendments pertaining to section 36, from its original form 
until it was repealed in 2011 by the TAA, concerned, like section 88, administrative and 
technical amendments such as the inclusion of the suspension of the obligation to pay 
additional tax, a penalty or interest to the scope of ‘pay now argue later’ rule56; the alteration 
of the interest rate to be applied to the amount of VAT paid in excess57; clarification 
regarding the funding to be used by SARS for paying such interest on excess VAT paid by 
the taxpayer58; and the inclusion of decisions or appeals by the special tax court and the 
                                                 
54 See Diagram 3 which, inter alia, displays section 36 in its original form (prior to any amendments). 
55 This is dealt with more fully in Chapter 5 para 5.4 below.  
56 Section 39 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 27 of 1997.  
57 Section 2 of the Value-Added Tax Amendment Act 61 of 1993. 
58 Section 18 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 140 of 1993 read with the Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue 
Laws Amendment Bill, 1993.  
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special tax board59. Section 22 of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act 20 of 1994, 
amended section 36, increasing the scope of taxpayers’ rights. Under this amendment, section 
36 was amended so as to oblige SARS to pay interest on the amount of VAT paid in excess in 
circumstances where SARS conceded to an appeal prior to the outcome of the appeal.60 
Similar to the amendment to section 88 in 2009, section 36 also underwent a substantial 
restructuring, which was effected by section 13 of the Taxation Laws Second Amendment 
Act 18 of 2009. Section 13, amended section 36 to, inter alia, include the suspension rule, 
outline the factors that the Commissioner may have taken into account when considering 
whether to accept or refuse an application for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ 
principle; and lastly, to ‘provide for interest where a payment [of tax] is made pending [the] 
consideration of an objection that is ultimately allowed’.61  
Section 36 was promulgated in 1991, some 29 years after the promulgation of section 
88. It is interesting to note that section 36, which was substantially similar to section 88 as it 
existed in 1991, was not incorporated with all of the amendments already effected to section 
88 by that time, although these were brought into effect at a later stage. For example, the 
amendment to section 88 obliging SARS to pay interest on the amount of tax paid in excess 
in circumstances where SARS conceded to an appeal prior to the court hearing the matter 
took place in 198962, prior to the promulgation of section 36. However, when section 36 was 
promulgated it lacked this specification, and it was only brought into effect by the 
amendment in 1994 under section 22 of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act 20 of 
1994. One can only presume that this was an oversight by the legislature, and that there was 
no merit in the initial exclusion.  
Diagram 3 below outlines of the development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle 
under section 36 up to its repeal, that is, its development for the years 1991 until 2009. 
  
                                                 
59 Section 22 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 20 of 1994 read with the Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation 
Laws Amendment Bill, 1994. 
60 Ibid.  
61 Memorandum on the Objects of the Taxation Laws Second Amendment Bill, 18 of 2009. 
62 Section 17 of the Income Tax Act 70 of 1989. 
27 
 
Diagram 3: The development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle under section 36 of the 
VAT Act: 1991 to 201163 
  
                                                 
63 The Amendment Acts read with the Explanatory Memoranda and the Memoranda on Objects relating to the amendments 







 The development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle under the section 164 of 
the TAB and the two Draft Tax Administration Bills preceding the TAB: 2009 to 
2011 
 
Section 164 of the TAB was preceded by two Draft Tax Administration Bills, namely, the 
version issued on 30 October 2009 and the later one on 29 October 2010. These collectively 
brought forward a number of important changes to the provisions regulating the ‘pay now 
argue later’ principle in the Income Tax Act and the VAT Act.  
Section 156 of the Draft Tax Administration Bill, 2009 was largely similar to section 
88 of the Income Tax and section 36 of the VAT Act after the amendment in 200964, save for 
the vital change of allowing ‘a senior SARS official’65 as opposed to ‘the Commissioner’ to 
consider an application for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle and direct 
whether such application should be accepted or refused.66 This, it is submitted, allows for a 
speedier application process. The specific criteria on which a ‘senior SARS official’ was to 
consider when deciding whether to accept or reject a request for the suspension of the 
obligation were not amended by the TAB or the Draft Tax Administration Bills preceding it. 
Section 164 of the Draft Tax Administration Bill, 2010 made provision for a situation 
in which a request for suspension of the obligation to pay tax may be made before an 
objection is lodged.67 This amendment was made ‘[i]n view of the fact that the due date for 
the payment of tax under an assessment is normally before the due date for lodging an 
objection and to cater for pre-objection requests by taxpayers for adequate reasons’ from 
SARS.68 However, a later change brought by section 164 of the TAB ensured the automatic 
lapsing of an approved suspension of the obligation to pay tax in circumstances where no 
objection was later lodged.69 This amendment by the TAB also placed an obligation on SARS 
officials to ‘periodically review’ the suspension of the obligation to pay tax, on a risk basis, 
‘during the dispute, and to revoke such suspension in the case of the dissipation of asset risks 
or delaying tactics employed by the taxpayer’.70 
Section 164 of the Draft Tax Administration Bill, 2010 amended the provision 
regulating the ‘pay now argue later’ principle so as to allow a senior SARS official to revoke 
a previously accepted suspension of the obligation to pay tax. The same criteria that a senior 
                                                 
64 Section 13 and section 38 of the Tax Laws Second Amendment Act 18 of 2009.  
65 A ‘senior SARS official’ is defined in section 1 of the TAA as a SARS official as referred to in section 6(3). In accordance 
with section 6(3), the powers and duties required under the TAA to be exercised by a senior SARS official must be exercised 
by either the Commissioner, a SARS official who has specific written authority from the Commissioner to do so, or a SARS 
official occupying a post designated by the Commissioner in writing for this purpose. 
66 Section 156 of the Draft Tax Administration Bill, 2009 read with the Memorandum on the Objects of the Draft Tax 
Administration Bill, 2009. 
67 Section 164 of the Draft Tax Administration Bill, 2010.  
68 Memorandum on the Objects of the Draft Taxation Administration Bill, 2010. 
69 Section 164 of the TAB.  
70 Memorandum on the Objections of the TAB.  
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SARS official could take into account when deciding whether to reject an application for the 
suspension of the obligation to tax, applied to the revocation of an accepted application.  
Section 164 of the Draft Tax Administration, 2010 made provision for a grace period 
following an application for a suspension of the obligation to pay tax preventing SARS from 
effecting ‘collection proceedings’ for five business days after notice of its decision regarding 
the application for the suspension of the obligation to pay tax or its decision regarding the 
revocation of the suspension of the obligation to pay was given to the taxpayer. This was 
changed in section 164 of the TAB to be extended to 10 business days, to include a situation 
in which the application for suspension of the obligation to pay tax is revoked, and to refer to 
‘recovery proceedings’ and not ‘collection proceedings’. This last change is a relevant point 
for purposes of Chapter 4 where a distinction is made between debt enforcement and debt 
collection proceedings forming part of broader debt recovery. It is submitted that, upon this 
distinction, this amendment broadened the scope of protection offered to taxpayers, so as to 
include debt enforcement and debt collection procedures in the grace period.  
There the two draft versions of the TAB, namely, the version issued on 30 October 
2009 and the other on 29 October 2010, and the final TAB, read and compare as seen below 










 The development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle under section 164 of the 
TAA: 2011 to date 
 
The promulgation of the TAA in 2011 brought with it section 164, a section analogous to the 
TAB. Section 164 in its original form71 was applicable to ‘tax’ and to situations which 
involve ‘an objection or appeal or pending decision of a court of law’ under section 133 of 
the TAA, which concerns appeals against decisions of the tax court. This is still the case 
today. Section 164 in its original form made provision for the suspension rule that a senior 
SARS official, upon ‘request’ by the taxpayer, is authorised to suspend the application of the 
‘pay now argue later’ principle, and included factors that a senior SARS official may have 
regard to when deciding whether to accept or reject such an application.  
Section 164 of the TAA has undergone three amendments since its promulgation in 
2011. The initial amendment was in 2012 and constituted merely a technical correction for 
purposes of clarity.72 The words ‘payment of’ were included between the word ‘suspend’ and 
‘the amount’, thus resulting in ‘suspend the payment of the amount’.73 The second 
amendment took place in 2013 in terms of section 58 of the Tax Administration Laws 
Amendment Act 39 of 2013, and provided that the amount of tax under an assessment that is 
subject to a dispute may be partially suspended.74 The amendment further provided a 
technical correction in order to clarify that section 164 caters for scenarios for suspension 
where the taxpayer ‘intends to object but is waiting, for example, for reasons requested under 
the rules or needs more time to formulate the grounds of objection, and where the taxpayer 
has already lodged an objection’.75 The third amendment to section 164 simplified the criteria 
that SARS may consider when presented with a request for the suspension of the obligation 
to pay tax and also clarified that these criteria must be considered in addition to other relevant 
factors.76 In terms of the Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Laws 
Amendment Bill, 2014, that an ‘initial proposal was to include the merits of the matter’ as 
one such criterion, however, ‘this was recognised to be in error as the purpose of the ‘pay 
now argue later’ principle is precisely to separate the adjudication of the merits of the matter, 
which happens before the tax court, and the payment and recovery of the tax debt’.77 
Diagram 5 below outlines of the development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle under 
section 164, that is, its development for the years 2011 to date. 
                                                 
71 See Diagram 5 which, inter alia, displays section 164 in its original form (prior to any amendments). 
72 Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2012.  
73 Section 64 of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act 21 of 2012.  
74 Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2013.  
75 Ibid.  
76 Section 50 of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act 44 of 2014 read with the Memorandum on the Objects of the 
Taxation Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2014. 
77 Ibid. However, in Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Services and Another, Kluh 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Services and Another 2011 (6) SA 65 (WCC) it was held that 
section 164 does indirectly provide for the consideration of merits in situations of rejecting or revoking an application for the 
suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle. This is dealt with more fully in Chapter 3 below.  
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Diagram 5: The development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle under section 164 of the 
TAA: 2011 to date78 
  
                                                 
78 The Amendment Acts and the Explanatory Memoranda and the Memoranda on Objects relating to the amendments were 








The development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle from its first appearance in the 
Income Tax Act in 1962 and the VAT Act in 1993, until their repeal in 2011, was relatively 
minor save for a marked change in the structure of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in 
2009, which brought with it the suspension rule. Following this amendment in 2009, the 
principle largely maintained its form in its incorporation into the TAB and, later, into the 
TAA. The dawn of the constitutional era in South Africa, as well as the rise in recognition of 
taxpayers’ rights, have, interestingly, not affected the development of the ‘pay now argue 
later’ principle in South Africa to any significant degree. Had the Constitutional Court heard 
the application brought by Van Heerden it is unlikely that the ‘pay now argue later’ principle 
would have changed, considering that subsequent constitutional challenges to the principle 

























                                                 






3. CHAPTER 3: THE CONTENT AND OPERATION OF SECTION 164 
OF THE TAA 
 
From the plain language of [the ‘pay now argue later’ principle] … [a] 
taxpayer has nothing to lose as he is to be refunded the excess amount paid 




Section 164 of the TAA begins by giving effect to the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in 
section 164(1). As previously mentioned, section 164(1) provides that the obligation on a 
taxpayer to pay tax and the right of SARS to ‘receive and recover tax’ from a taxpayer is not 
automatically suspended by the filing of an objection or an appeal, or pending the decision of 
a court of law pursuant to an appeal, against a decision of the tax court. The substance of 
section 164 concerns the procedure relating to the application for and the effect of a decision 
for the suspension of the obligation to pay tax by a senior SARS official.  
Following the reasoning of Tsoka J in Modibane v South African Revenue Service81 in 
the epigraph above, a taxpayer has, according to the plain language of section 164 (then 
section 88), ‘nothing to lose’ from the operation of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle. 
Objectively this may be true, as there is supposed restoration of the taxpayer to their original 
position should they be found not liable for the tax debt. This position is concurred by 
Arnold, who states that ‘[o]bviously, if a taxpayer is successful in disputing the amount of tax 
assessed, the amount should be refunded with interest so that, as much as possible, the 
taxpayer is restored to the situation he would have been in if the tax had been correctly 
assessed in the first place’.82 However, according to Olivier, the operation of the ‘pay now 
argue later’ principle could result in the ‘inability to expand or pay debts, or to the destruction 
of liquidity, all of which also have a detrimental effect on a taxpayer’s ability to pay [tax]’.83 
The TAA does provide for minimal relief for a taxpayer to alleviate the consequences of the 
‘pay now argue later’ principle, namely, the suspension rule, as dealt with below. 
Furthermore, besides the relief in terms of the TAA, a taxpayer dissatisfied with a decision 
refusing the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle may pursue judicial review in 
                                                 
80 Modibane v South African Revenue Service (unreported case no 09/9651) of 20 October 2011 at para 12.  
81 Ibid. 
82 BJ Arnold ‘Brief for the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Republic of South Africa’ as Annexure “H” to the 
application for The Commissioner for Inland Revenue supra note 26 at page 22. 
83 Olivier op cit note 33 at 196.  
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terms of section 6 of PAJA,84 has the option of entering into an instalment payment 
agreement85 in certain circumstances, and is entitled to the refund of interest accumulated on 
the amount of excess tax paid to the extent that the taxpayer is found not to be liable for the 
tax debt.86  
 
 The procedure for an application for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ 
principle: Section 164(2), (4), (5) and (6) 
 
S 164(2) gives effect to the power of a senior SARS official to suspend a taxpayer’s 
obligation to pay tax upon the application by such taxpayer. In practice, a request by a 
taxpayer for the suspension of the obligation to pay tax due under an assessment takes the 
form of a letter setting out such taxpayer’s compliance with the criteria identified in section 
164(3), as well section 164(5) (dealt with in paragraph 3.3 below). Currently, there is no 
prescribed form for such an application and it is not possible to submit a request for 
suspension via eFiling. SARS, however, intends to enhance eFiling for this purpose so that it 
will be able to better track requests for suspension of payment. 
 
Diagram 6: The provision giving a senior SARS official the power to suspend the ‘pay now 
argue later’ upon application by a taxpayer  
Section 164(2) provides that ‘[a] taxpayer may request a senior SARS officialXto suspend 
the payment of tax or a portion thereofYdue under an assessment if the taxpayer intends to 
dispute or disputesZthe liability to pay that tax under Chapter 9 [Dispute Resolution]’ 
(own emphasis). 
 
X In practice, a letter of application for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ 
principle is sent by the taxpayer to the relevant SARS contact centre, as well as, if 
applicable, to any SARS official with whom the taxpayer may have had dealings. 
Y This phrase provides for a situation in which a taxpayer may concede to the liability 
of a portion of the tax due under an assessment, but disputes or intends to dispute the 
liability to pay the remaining portion of the tax due under the assessment. The 
request for suspension of the obligation to pay tax thus only applies to the latter and 
the balance not disputed would need to be paid to SARS. 
Z As previously mentioned, section 164 allows for the suspension of the obligation to 
pay tax where the taxpayer ‘intends to object but is waiting, for example, for reasons 
requested under the rules or needs more time to formulate the grounds of objection, 
                                                 
84 B Croome & L Olivier Tax Administration 2 ed (2015) at page 578.  
85 Section 167 of the TAA.  
86 Section 164(7) of the TAA.  
39 
 
and where the taxpayer has already lodged an objection’.87 Therefore section 164 
caters not only for situations in which the taxpayer has already lodged an objection. 
In practice, the request for the suspension of the obligation to pay tax is often 
submitted simultaneously with a notice of objection against the relevant assessment. 
 
There are two ways in which a revocation of a decision to suspension of the ‘pay now 
argue later’ principle occurs. Section 164(4) concerns the revocation of the suspension of the 
obligation to pay tax by operation of law. This section does not impose a discretion on a 
senior SARS official to revoke the decision to suspend the obligation to pay tax. Revocation 
takes place ‘with immediate effect’ upon the occurrence of three events, namely, no objection 
is lodged; an objection is disallowed and no appeal is lodged; or an appeal to the tax board or 
court is unsuccessful and no further appeal is noted. Section 164(5) concerns the revocation 
of the suspension of the obligation to pay tax at the discretion of a senior SARS official. In 
this scenario, the same factors that are considered in the rejection of an application for the 
suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle will be considered when a senior SARS 
official decides whether to revoke the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle. On 
the interpretation of the wording of section 164(5), the senior SARS official making the 
decision whether or not to revoke the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle need 
not be the same senior SARS official who made the decision to suspend the obligation to pay 
tax in the first instance. 
Section 164(6) makes provision for a grace period for taxpayers following a request 
for a suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle or where a senior SARS official 
revokes the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle. In terms of this provision, 
SARS may not effect recovery of tax due under an assessment within ten business days 
following a decision made on a request for suspension of the obligation to pay tax or the 
revocation of the suspension of the obligation to pay tax. This provides some protection to 
taxpayers. However, the abovementioned grace period may not be adhered to in the limited 
circumstances where SARS has a reasonable belief that there is a risk of dissipation of assets 
by the taxpayer. Unfortunately, SARS does not always adhere to the period prescribed in the 
law and the taxpayer’s only recourse would be to apply to the High Court for relief or to seek 





                                                 
87 Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2013.  
88 See Part F of the TAA.  
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 The ‘discretion’ of a senior SARS official to approve or reject an application for 
the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle: Section 164(3) and 164(5) 
 
A senior SARS official is not obliged, upon a taxpayer’s request, to suspend the obligation to 
pay tax due under an assessment even if the criteria under section 164(3) are met. It remains 
within the absolute discretion of a senior SARS official to accept or reject such a request.89 
Section 164(3) outlines the factors that a senior SARS official may take into account when 
deciding whether to accept such an application for the obligation to pay tax to be suspended. 
The section states that a senior SARS official must, in exercising his or her discretion, have 
‘regard to relevant factors’. It is submitted that, in practice, it is the taxpayer who will bring 
the relevant factors to the attention of the senior SARS official in the letter of application for 
the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle. There is no case law or guidance from 
the legislature or SARS as to the nature of the list of ‘relevant factors’ provided for in section 
164(3), that is, whether the list of factors is exhaustive or the importance that should be 
placed on the different factors. However, in accordance with Croome & Olivier’s 
interpretation of the provision, ‘it is apparent that SARS needs to consider the factors stated 
in s 164[3] and may also take account of other factors which are not stated in the section’.90 It 
is interesting to note that section 164(3) refers to ‘the disputed tax’ and not, as in section 
164(2), to both disputed tax and the tax which the taxpayer intends to dispute. It is submitted, 
however, that section 164(3) should be interpreted as applying to both scenarios.  
 
Diagram 7: The factors that may be considered by a senior SARS official in approving an 
application for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle  
Section 164(3) provides that ‘[a] senior SARS official may suspend payment of the 
disputed tax or a portion thereof having regard to relevant factors, including— (a) whether 
the recovery of the disputed tax will be in jeopardy or there will be a risk of dissipation of 
assetsX; (b) the compliance history of the taxpayer with SARSY; (c) whether fraud is 
prima facie involved in the origin of the disputeZ; (d) whether payment will result in 
irreparable hardship to the taxpayer not justified by the prejudice to SARS or the fiscus if 
the disputed tax is not paid or recovered[; or (e) whether the taxpayer has tendered 
adequate security for the payment of the disputed tax and accepting it is in the interest of 
SARS or the fiscus\’ (own emphasis). 
 
X In order to satisfy this criterion, the taxpayer may rely on the provision of security for 
the payment of the disputed tax or the tax intended to be disputed. Provision of 
                                                 
89 Arnold op cit note 82 at page 24 stated that ‘[t]he Commissioner’s discretion in this regard is important because there may 
be legitimate circumstances in which taxpayers cannot pay their taxes pending an appeal without significantly adverse 
consequences’. 
90 Croome & Olivier op cit note 84 at page 379. 
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security serves to mitigate the concerns that a senior SARS official may have with 
regard to whether the suspension of the obligation to pay the disputed tax, or tax 
intended to be disputed, will put the recovery of the tax in jeopardy, as well as 
neutralising the risk that the taxpayer will dissipate the assets prior to the payment of 
the tax due under an assessment, to the extent that the taxpayer is ultimately held 
liable for such tax. 
Y  A history of non-compliance will decrease the prospects of a successful outcome of a 
request for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle by the taxpayer and, 
it is submitted, rightly so. From practice it appears that the failure to file income tax 
and VAT returns is regarded as ‘non-compliance’ by SARS and a request for 
suspension will thus be refused should such a failure be present. 
Z  A taxpayer must satisfy the senior SARS official that fraud was not ‘involved in the 
origin of the dispute’, which, according to Croome & Olivier, effectively means that 
the ‘dispute is genuine’.91 It is good practice to include in the letter of application for 
the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle that SARS has not alleged that 
fraud was involved in the origin of the dispute, should this be the case.  
[ This criterion quintessentially depicts the battle between the rights if a taxpayer and 
the powers of SARS. In practice, it is argued in the letter of application for the 
suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle that the deferred payment of the tax 
due to SARS would not negatively affect SARS or the fiscus, to the extent that the 
taxpayer is ultimately held liable for such tax92. The reason for this is that such funds 
would be recoverable by SARS from the taxpayer with interest, as provided for in the 
TAA. The provision of security by the taxpayer is also helpful in this regard. 
According to Croome & Olivier, ‘[t]o show irreparable hardship [to the taxpayer] is 
difficult but a taxpayer should not be forced to sell his or her assets which he or she 
has held as an investment for a long period of time and be compelled to realise such 
asset within a short period of time by way of a forced sale, which will cause the 
taxpayer financial loss which may never be recovered’.93 
\ As is evident from above, the provision of security, although not an absolute 
requirement, is imperative, in most circumstances, in order to succeed with a request 
for the suspension of the obligation to pay tax. This is burdensome on the taxpayer 
and not always possible. The question arises as to whether the suspension of the 
obligation to pay tax would be condoned in a situation in which the taxpayer is 
unable to provide security. Croome & Olivier provide examples of different types of 
security, namely, mortgage bonds over immovable property, ‘which is often accepted 
                                                 
91 Croome & Olivier op cit note 84 at page 379.  
92 Interestingly this, which is an argument that is commonly used in practice, is the reverse of the quote made in Modibane 
supra note 79. 
93 Croome & Olivier op cit note 84 at page 379.  
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by SARS as constituting adequate security’, a ‘bank guarantee’, a guarantee from ‘a 
holding company to issue a guarantee in favour of SARS securing payment of the 
subsidiary’s tax debts’ or ‘a cession of loan accounts or a pledge of listed or unlisted 
shares’.94 
 
Section 164(5), on the other hand, provides that a senior SARS official may deny an 
application for the suspension of the obligation to pay tax provided he or she is satisfied that 
the various factors listed in section 164(5) are present. A senior SARS official is not obliged 
to deny a request for the suspension of the obligation to pay tax due under an assessment 
even if the factors under section 164(5) are met. As previously mentioned, it is within the 
absolute discretion of such senior SARS official to accept or reject such a request. PAJA 
provides for judicial review of a decision by a senior SARS official to reject an application to 
the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, as more fully discussed below in 
paragraph 3.5.  
 
Diagram 8: The factors that may be considered by a senior SARS official in denying an 
application for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle  
Section 164(5) provides that ‘[a] senior SARS official may deny a request in terms of 
subsection (2)… if satisfied that— (a) after the lodging of the objection or appeal, the 
objection or appeal is frivolous or vexatiousX; (b) the taxpayer is employing dilatory 
tactics in conducting the objection or appealY; (c) on further consideration of the factors 
referred to in subsection (3), the suspension should not have been givenZ; or (d) there is a 
material change in any of the factors referred to in subsection (3), upon which the decision 
to suspend payment of the amount involved was based[’ (own emphasis). 
 
X  In practice, seeking professional advice assists in proving that this criterion is not 
present. A ‘frivolous’ objection or appeal would be one which is ‘[l]acking a legal 
basis or legal merit’95 and a ‘vexatious’ objection or appeal would be one ‘without 
reasonable or probable cause or excuse’.96 According to Croome & Olivier ‘[t]his is 
to prevent taxpayers from filing objections that are without substance and with one 
purpose in mind and that is to delay the inevitable payment of the tax, which is 
lawfully due to SARS’.97 In Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Services and Another, Kluh Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Services and Another98 Binns-Ward J held that section 164 
                                                 
94 Croome & Olivier op cit note 84 at page 378.  
95 Black’s Law Dictionary op cit note 1 at the definition of ‘frivolous’. 
96 Ibid at the definition of ‘vexatious’.  
97 Croome & Olivier op cit note 84 at page 381.  
98 Capstone 556 and Kluh supra note 77. 
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‘expressly refers to the merits of the appeal as a relevant consideration’ due its 
incorporation of section 164(5)(a)99 ‘which authorises the Commissioner [now a 
senior SARS official] to refuse a request if he or she is satisfied that the appeal is 
frivolous or vexatious’.100 This is in contrast to the Memorandum on the Objects of 
the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2014 where it was stated that a 
decision was made against including the merits of the case as a criterion to be 
considered by a senior SARS official when deciding whether to accept or reject an 
application for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle. 
Y  In practice, seeking professional advice assists in proving that this criterion is not 
present. Seeking professional advice, although an obvious thing to do, may lead 
SARS to conclude that the taxpayer is employing delaying tactics, that the taxpayer is 
merely applying for the suspension of the obligation to pay tax in order to delay the 
payment of the tax debt.  
Z  In practice, this is not mentioned in the letter of application for the suspension of the 
‘pay now argue later’ principle. This is left to be decided by the senior SARS official.  
[  In practice, this is not mentioned in the letter of application for the suspension of the 
‘pay now argue later’ principle but is left to a decision by the senior SARS official. A 
‘material change’ refers to a substantial change in the factors referred to in section 
164(3).  
 
 The effect of the alteration of the tax debt: Section 164(7) and (8) 
 
The provisions contained in section 164(7) and (8) are concerned with the procedure 
following the resolution of a dispute regarding the liability of a tax debt. Section 164(8) 
provides for the procedure regarding refunds and set-off following the alteration of a tax debt. 
It provides that the ‘provisions of section 191 apply with the necessary changes’. Section 191 
concerns refunds subject to set-off and deferral and allows SARS to set off from an 
outstanding tax debt of the taxpayer any amount of tax that is refundable, including interest 
thereon. Section 164(7) outlines the implications of interest on amounts short-paid or paid in 
excess following the alteration of a tax debt.  
 
Diagram 9: The procedures regulating amounts paid in excess, as well as amounts short-
paid, and the payment of interest out: an in-depth analysis of section 164(7)  
S 164(7) provides that ‘[i]f an assessment or a decision referred to in section 104(2)nis 
altered in accordance with— (a) an objection or appealo; (b) a decision of a court of law 
pursuant to an appeal under section 133p; or (c) decision by SARS to concede the appeal 
                                                 
99 At the time this case was heard the section referred to was section 164(4)(a) of the TAA.  
100 Capstone 556 and Kluh supra note 77 at para 32.  
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to the tax board or the tax court or other court of lawq, a due adjustment must be mader, 
amounts paid in excess refunded with interest at the prescribed rate, the interest being 
calculated from the date that excess was received by SARS to the date the refunded tax is 
paids, and amounts short-paid are recoverable with interest calculated as provided in 
section 187(1)t’. (own emphasis) 
 
n  A decision referred to in section 104(2) of the TAA refers to decisions to extend the 
period for lodging an objection, a decision not to extend the period for lodging an 
appeal, and any other decision that may be objected to or appealed against under a 
tax Act.  
o  This is a matter of fact.  
p  This is a matter of fact and refers to the decision of a court of law pursuant to an 
appeal against a decision of the Tax Court.  
q  This is a matter of fact.  
r  SARS has no discretion in this regard. A due adjustment is made by operation of law, 
provided the circumstances in section 164(7) are met.  
s It is interesting to note that amounts paid in excess are refunded to the taxpayer with 
interest that is calculated at a lesser interest rate than amounts that are short-paid by a 
taxpayer to SARS. In addition, interest received by the taxpayer is taxable101, 
whereas interest paid by the taxpayer is not deductible.102 
t  This refers to the general rules regarding interest that are applicable to SARS.  
 
 The potential remedy for the refusal of an application for the suspension of the 
‘pay now argue later’ principle: judicial review  
 
According to Croome & Olivier: 
 
When SARS refuses a taxpayer’s request to postpone payment [of tax] 
subject to objection or appeal, the taxpayer may not object or appeal against 
that decision under the provisions of the TAA. The taxpayer would be 
required to pursue the matter in the High Court on the basis that SARS has 
not complied with its obligations under the [PAJA]. SARS, in determining 
whether a taxpayer should be granted a suspension of payment, must adhere 
to the rules of administrative justice and where it fails to do so, a taxpayer 
should succeed in having the decision reviewed and set aside by the High 
Court.103 
                                                 
101 See the definition of ‘gross income’ in section 1(1) of the Income Tax Act.  
102 Section 23(d) of the Income Tax Act. 
103 Croome & Olivier op cit note 84 at 381.  
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Section 164 does not provide for a procedure in which a taxpayer may object or 
appeal against the decision of a senior SARS official to reject an application for the 
suspension of the payment of tax, or for a procedure in which the taxpayer may request that 
such senior SARS official provides reasons for such a decision. PAJA, however, does. PAJA 
was promulgated in order to ‘promote an efficient administration and good governance… 
[and to] create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public 
administration or in the exercise of a public power or the performance of public function, by 
giving effect to the right to just administrative action’.104  
Following from the definitions in PAJA of ‘administrative action’X and a 
‘decision’Y below, it is submitted that a decision made by a senior SARS official to approve 
or reject the application by a taxpayer to suspend the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in terms 
of section 164(2) is administrative action and is thus subject to regulation by PAJA.  
Furthermore, this was confirmed with the finding in Metcash (supra)105, with regard to 
section 36 of the VAT Act, a finding, which, it is submitted, is equally applicable to 
circumstances involving income tax. Kriegler J held that:  
 
The Commissioner, in exercising the power under section 36, is clearly 
implementing legislation and as such the exercise of the section 36 power 
constitutes administrative action… The Act106 gives the Commissioner the 
discretion to suspend an obligation to pay… The Commissioner must, 
                                                 
104 Preamble to PAJA.  
105 In Metcash supra note 19, the Constitutional Court decided on whether section 36 of the VAT Act unjustifiably limited 
the right of access to courts. This is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 5.  
106 Reference here is made to the VAT Act. 
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however, be able to justify his decision as being rational. The action must 
also constitute “just administrative action” as required by section 33 of the 
Constitution and be in compliance with any legislation governing the review 
of administrative action.107 
 
Section 6 of PAJA provides for so-called ‘[j]udicial review of administrative action’. 
In principle, this allows a court or tribunal to judicially review administrative action if, inter 
alia, the administrator who took the decision was not authorised to do so by the empowering 
provision108, the administrative action was procedurally unfair109, or the action was taken 
because irrelevant considerations were taken into account or relevant consideration were not 
considered110. However, judicial review proceedings have been argued to be limited in 
nature.111 Therefore, although the remedy of judicial review exists for a taxpayer whose 
application for suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle was rejected, it is criticised 
for not being effective. According to Olivier:  
 
The question may be asked whether the review procedure is worth anything 
when a taxpayer cannot question the validity of the assessment on which the 
statement is based. Often the ground on which a decision is taken on review 
is that it is so grossly unreasonable that the decision-maker failed to apply his 
mind to the matter. However, to prove this, the correctness of the underlying 
assessment often has to be dealt with.112 
 
It is submitted that judicial review is not a sufficient remedy for a taxpayer whose application 
for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle has been refused. It has been 
suggested that ‘it might be appropriate to provide taxpayers with a right of appeal if the 
Commissioner decides not to exercise his discretion’.113 However, the downside of this is that 
this may result in the very situation which the ‘pay now argue later’ principle is aimed at 




Although objectively ‘[f]rom the plain language of [the ‘pay now argue later’ principle] … 
[a] taxpayer has nothing to lose as he is to be refunded the excess amount paid together with 
                                                 
107 Metcash supra note 19 at para 42.  
108 Section 6(2)(a) of PAJA.  
109 Section 6(2)(c) of PAJA.  
110 Section 6(2)(e)(iii) of PAJA.  
111 Olivier op cit note 33 at page 197. 
112 Ibid at page 197. 
113 Arnold op cit note 82 at pages 56-7. 
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interest thereon’114, subjectively the operation of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle may 
result in pecuniary loss to the taxpayer. Paying the tax due could result in unjustified financial 
hardship for the taxpayer, taking into account that the taxpayer may not in fact even be liable 
for this tax. Paying the tax may also, in certain circumstances, restrict the taxpayer from 
disputing the liability of the tax debt due to a lack of funds after having satisfied the tax debt.  
The suspension rule does, in principle, provide relief for the taxpayer against the 
operation of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle. Furthermore, in the event that an application 
for the suspension of the principle is refused, the taxpayer is entitled to take such decision on 
judicial review in terms of PAJA. However, the decision to apply for the suspension of the 
‘pay now argue later’ principle must be taken mindful of the effect of an alteration of the tax 
debt referred to above in paragraph 3.4, namely, that ‘when a taxpayer chooses not to pay the 
tax, they will need to apply for the postponement of payment under section 164 of the TAA, 
and in the event that their objection does not succeed they will be liable for interest from the 
second date of the assessment issued to them’.115 The interest can, if the taxpayer does not 
succeed with their objection and appeal, amount to a significant amount of money where the 
dispute takes a few years to finalise. 
  
                                                 
114 Modibane supra note 80 at para 12.  






4. CHAPTER 4: A COMPARISON OF THE ‘PAY NOW ARGUE LATER’ 
PRINCIPLE WITH SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL DEBT ENFORCEMENT 
PROCEDURES 
 
[T]he ordinary way of securing execution in settlement of debts due is 




It is necessary for purposes of this research to make a distinction between debt enforcement 
and debt collection. Both form part of broader debt recovery. However, it is submitted that 
the former speaks to an initial step in the debt recovery process of securing in law the liability 
of a disputed debt, that is, establishing that the debt is enforceable in law and that the said 
debtor is liable therefor, whereas debt collection refers to the actual execution processes117 
effected after liability for the debt has been duly ascertained118. 
In civil procedure, debt enforcement must, ordinarily, precede debt collection. 
However, in tax administration the operation of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle results in 
debt enforcement and debt collection running in reverse of or concurrently with each other; 
hence the term ‘pay now argue later’ is used. Essentially this principle removes from debt 
recovery the step of securing in law the liability of a disputed debt, which is, in civil 
procedure, a vital component of and precursor to debt collection. It is submitted that the basis 
for this difference in chronology is that a fiscal debt and the liability thereof arises ex lege, 
that is, by operation of law, unlike a civil debt. After the tax debt becomes due, recorded in 
the form of an assessment, it is protected and enforced through the ‘pay now argue later’ 
principle and the collection of tax is ensured. The ‘pay now argue later’ principle therefore 
provides for a shorter and quicker debt enforcement procedure than that of the ordinary debt 
enforcement process in civil procedure by removing the need to first establish the liability for 
the disputed tax debt.  
It is submitted that the ‘pay now argue later’ principle is a sui generis debt 
enforcement procedure in that it does not take the form of litigation, which is characteristic of 
ordinary civil debt enforcement whereby litigation is the procedural step by which a creditor 
                                                 
116 Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC) at para 19.  
117 See Ibid at para 13 where Mokgoro J held that ‘[e]xecution is a means of enforcing a judgment or order of court and is 
incident to the judicial process’. 
118 See Ibid at para 11 where Mokgoro J held that ‘[a] trial or hearing before a court or tribunal is not an end in itself [but]… 
is a means of determining whether a legal obligation exists and whether the coercive power of the state can be invoked to 
enforce an obligation…’.  
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enforces the payment of a civil debt due, but instead occurs automatically by operation of 
law. This brings about not only a departure from the ordinary sequence of events in debt 
recovery in civil procedure, but also borders on self-help119 in that the fiscus is permitted to 
take the debt recovery process into its own hands without recourse to the judiciary, being an 
independent third party. Should the taxpayer dispute the liability for a fiscal debt, this is dealt 
with separately and is removed from the fiscal debt recovery process.120 To the extent that the 
judgment is awarded in favour of the taxpayer, a dispute regarding the liability for the fiscal 
debt will result in civil debt collection procedures being available to the taxpayer. As stated in 
the epigraph, ‘the ordinary way of securing execution in settlement of debts due is through 
the court process’.121 However, the ‘pay now argue later’ principle secures debt collection 
without the need for recourse to the judiciary. Therefore, on the face of it, the ‘pay now argue 
later’ principle is an unusual and peculiar departure from the normal rules regulating debt 
enforcement procedures.  
Diagram 10 below provides an overview of the comparison in civil debt recovery and 
fiscal debt recovery procedures in South Africa.  
 
Diagram 10: A comparison of civil and fiscal debt recovery 
The ordinary civil debt recovery process 
 
A civil contractual debt 
arises in terms of a 
contract and the 




StepX: The first step in 
civil debt recovery is 
debt enforcement, 
which involves judicial 
recourse, namely, an 
application or action to 




StepY: The second step 
in civil debt recovery is 
debt collection, 
provided that judgment 
was awarded in favour 
of the creditor in 
StepX, such as writs 
and warrants of 
execution, emoluments, 






                                                 
119 This is discussed in Metcash supra note 19 – although the Constitutional Court found that it did not amount to self-help. 
This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.  
120 In the event that a taxpayer does decide to ‘argue later’, the onus rests on the taxpayer in terms of section 102(1) of the 
Tax Administration Act to prove, inter alia, ‘that an amount, transaction, event or item is exempt or otherwise not taxable’. 
121 Lesapo supra note 116 at para 19.  
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The fiscal debt recovery process  
 
A fiscal debt arises by 
operation of law and is 




StepX: The first step in 
fiscal debt recovery 
occurs by operation of 
law in terms of the ‘pay 





StepY: The second step 
in fiscal debt recovery 
consists of debt 
collection procedures123 
such as application for a 
civil judgment for 
recovery of tax,124 
sequestration of a 
person for an 
outstanding tax125 and 
collection of debt from 
third parties.126 
     
 Separated Step: A dispute regarding 
the liability of fiscal debt which is a 
separate procedure for debt 
enforcement. The question of a 
dispute on the liability of a fiscal debt 
is thus removed from the debt 





It is accepted that there are debt enforcement procedures both in civil procedure and 
fiscal administration which operate as legal exceptions to ordinary debt recovery in civil 
procedure. As mentioned in Chapter 1, these include provisional sentence procedure and 





                                                 
122 Sections 169 and 170 of the TAA.  
123 The debt collection procedures relating to sequestration, liquidation, winding up of a person for an outstanding tax and 
collection of debt from third parties also only involve recourse to and supervision by a senior SARS official. However, this 
will not be dealt with in this research. 
124 Section 172 of the TAA.  
125 Section 177 of the TAA.  
126 Section 179 of the TAA.  
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 Nature of a civil debt versus a fiscal debt  
 
As previously mentioned, the reason for the difference in chronology between civil debt 
recovery and fiscal debt recovery is that a fiscal debt and the liability thereof arises ex lege 
unlike a civil debt. This speaks to the nature of the different debts.  
The nature of a civil debt in terms of a contract is founded on two sources, first, the 
existence of a contract and, secondly, that the obligations arising from the contract are 
enforceable in law.127 An obligation, as referred to in this context, creates a ‘legal relation’ 
between two or more persons, by the creation of a vinculum iurus, a ‘legal tie or bond’.128 
The legal relation is twofold in that it places a duty to perform on one person and the right to 
receive such performance by another.129 The legal basis underlying most civil claims for 
recovery of a contractual debt is a claim for specific performance, with specific performance 
for the payment of the debt in terms of the contract being listed as a prayer in the summons 
submitted to court.130 Specific performance is defined as a claim for ‘[t]he rendering, as 
nearly as practicable, of a promised performance through a judgment or decree’.131 A claim 
for specific performance by a creditor is founded on the contract itself, not on the breach 
thereof by the debtor.132 To elaborate on this, a creditor is entitled to claim specific 
performance provided a valid contract exists and the debtor’s obligation in terms of the 
contract is enforceable in law.133 The debtor need not be in mora, that is, the debtor need not 
be in default, for a claim for specific performance to be valid.134 The rationale underlying a 
claim for specific performance is to stay with the agreement, thereby upholding the maxim of 
pacta servanda sunt, namely, that a contract must be honoured or that an agreement must be 
kept.135 
It is worthwhile at this juncture to elaborate briefly on the ordinary civil debt 
enforcement procedure, which, as previously mentioned, is, in most cases, brought on the 
ground of specific performance for the payment of a debt in terms of a contract. The creditor 
is required to bring an action to court in order to bring effect to the right to claim specific 
performance. However, as is consistent with debt enforcement in civil procedure, it does not 
take place automatically by operation of law as with the ‘pay now argue later’ principle. In 
the Appellate Division in Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society136, Hefer JA asserted 
that the granting of an order of specific performance is ‘entirely a matter for the discretion of 
                                                 
127 Professor Lubbe, G F, Personal correspondence on 09-01-2017. 
128 Van Huysten, Lubbe & Reinecke Contract General Principles 5 ed (2016) at page 2.  
129 Ibid at page 2.  
130 A summons is a step in civil procedure.   
131 Black’s Law Dictionary op cit note 1 at the definition of ‘specific performance’. 
132 See Ridley v Marais 1939 AD 5 at page 9 where it was held by Watermeyer JA that ‘[t]here seems to have been some 
confusion of thought in the mind of the pleader who drafted the exception which is displayed by the concluding words “so as 
to put him in mora”’. 
133 See Farmers' Co-operative Society (Reg.) v Berry 1912 AD 343. 
134 Van Huysten et al. op cit 128 at page 367. 
135 Ibid at page 11; Black’s Law Dictionary op cit note 1 at the definition of at the definition of ‘pacta sunt servanda’.  
136 1986 (2) All SA 30 (A). 
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the Court’ and that, ‘a-part [sic] from the rule that the discretion is to be exercised judicially 
upon a consideration of all the relevant facts… no rules can be prescribed to regulate the 
exercise of the Court’s discretion’, as ‘any curtailment of the Court’s discretion inevitably 
entails an erosion of the… [creditor’s]… right to performance’.137 Relevant factors that a 
court should take into account are, inter alia, the interests of both contracting parties as well 
as any third parties involved138 and whether specific performance is objectively and 
subjectively possible139. 
The nature of a fiscal debt is that it arises by operation of law. According to section 
169 of the TAA, ‘an amount of tax due or payable in terms of a tax Act is a tax debt due to 
SARS for the benefit of the National Revenue Fund’. A tax debt due to the fiscus is in terms 
of section 169(1) of the TAA ‘[a]n amount of tax due or payable in terms of a tax Act’. 
According to section 170 of the TAA a tax debt is recorded by way of an ‘assessment’, which 
is defined in section 1 of the TAA as ‘the determination of the amount of a tax liability or 
refund, by way of self-assessment or assessment by SARS’. According to Singh v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service140 SARS cannot try and collect tax 
before there is an assessment.141 It was held further by Cloete JA and Heher AJA in Singh 
that ‘s 36… recognises that an obligation to pay and the right to recover already exist; it does 
not create such obligations’142, such obligations are instead, it is submitted, created ex lege in 
terms of the section 169. An assessment is a necessary notification or recording of the debt 
which is, according to the Supreme Court of Appeal in Singh, a necessary requirement before 
collection can be effected. 
Therefore, although the respective tax Act is subject to different interpretations it is by 
operation of law that the fiscal debt arises. In essence, a claim for a fiscal debt is also rests on 
an underlying claim for specific performance. SARS’ right to ‘receive and recover tax’ tax is 
a monetary claim and such monetary claims are also, in principle, susceptible to specific 
performance as a remedy for the collection of debt. An example of where SARS specifically 
refers to using specific performance is a compromise agreement where it has been stipulated 
‘that in the event of a breach, SARS could cancel the agreement and claim the full tax debt 
owing before the comprise agreement was entered into, or claim specific performance of the 
compromise agreement’.143 However, by virtue of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, 
enforcement of the fiscal debt occurs by operation of law and without the need for recourse to 
courts, as is the case with ordinary claim of specific performance in civil procedure. 
 
                                                 
137 Benson supra note 136 at para 10 and 15-6. 
138 Haynes v Kingwilliam’s Town Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) at pages 378-9.  
139 Van Huysten et al. op cit 128 at pages 369-70 and footnote 24. 
140 2003 (4) SA 520 (SCA). 
141 Ibid at para 34. Unless there is a so-called ‘jeopardy assessment’ in terms of the TAA.  
142 Ibid at para 11. It is submitted that this is equally permissible to section 164 of the TAA.  




 Civil debt enforcement procedures 
 
 The ‘provisional sentence’ procedure  
 
The civil debt enforcement procedure of provisional sentence arms a creditor with recourse to 
claim full and immediate payment of a debt, more specifically, the payment of the provisional 
judgment debt of the provisional sentence, prior to a final judgment being made in the 
principal case144 regarding the liability for the alleged debt.145  
There are four inherent characteristics of the provisional sentence procedure. First, the 
provisional sentence procedure is an action only available to a creditor who can evidence a 
civil debt claim against a debtor by using a so-called liquid document.146 A liquid document 
is defined as a document which ‘evidences by its terms, and without resort to evidence 
extrinsic thereto… an unconditional acknowledgement of indebtedness in an ascertained sum 
of money, the payment of which is due to the creditor’.147 An example of a liquid document 
is a cheque, an acknowledgment of debt, a promissory note, a mortgage bond, a bill of 
exchange, a guarantee or ‘an architect’s certificate certifying that a builder has performed 
work in terms of a building contract’.148 Secondly, a provisional sentence procedure can only 
result in ‘a provisional or interlocutory order’, that is ‘[f]inal judgment is still to be 
considered in the principal case’ which means that, ‘[i]n the final instance, the claim against 
the… [debtor]… can still be dismissed’.149 Thirdly, is that ‘while on the one hand it entitles 
the… [creditor]… to payment of the judgment debt immediately, that is, before entering into 
the principal case, on the other hand it affords the… [debtor]… the right to insist on security 
for repayment pending the final outcome’.150 Lastly, according to rule 8 of the Uniform Rules 
of Court and rule 14A of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the 
Magistrates’ Courts of South Africa, which outline the procedure for a provisional sentence, 
provide that a debtor against whom a provisional sentence has been granted is prohibited 
from entering into the principal case if such debtor fails to satisfy the amount of the judgment 
of provisional sentence and costs; likewise the creditor may not enter into the principal case if 
security has not been provided.151 
In response to the issue of a provisional sentence summons, a debtor can either 
immediately pay the claim plus interest, or the debtor can decide to oppose the case.152 In the 
                                                 
144 ‘The ‘principal case’ is a phrase used to refer to the underlying transaction between the parties as a result of which a 
negotiable instrument has been issued, the merits of the underlying transaction now bring in dispute’ in Stephan Pete, David 
Hulme & Max du Plessis, et al. Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2 ed (2011) at page 375 footnote 41. 
145 Ibid at page 375. 
146 Twee Jonge supra note 21 at para 15. 
147 Rich and Others v Lagerwey 1974 (4) SA 748 (A) at 754H. 
148 Pete et al op cit note 144 at 378.  
149 Twee Jonge supra note 21 at para 16. 
150 Ibid at para 16. 
151 This forms the crux of the constitutional debate in the Twee Jonge supra note 21. 
152 Pete et al op cit note 144 at 378. 
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latter circumstance the debtor has two options, namely, to deny liability of the alleged debt on 
the basis of issues relating to the validity or liquidity of the liquid document itself, for 
example ‘the authenticity of the… [debtor’s]… signature’153; or to deny liability of the 
alleged debt on the basis of issues external to the liquid document.154 A debtor ‘who relies on 
a defence which goes beyond the liquid document is required to produce sufficient proof of 
that defence to satisfy the court that the probability of success in the principal case is against 
the… [creditor]… before provisional sentence can be refused’.155 Therefore it is submitted 
that there is a dual burden of proof, or a so-called ‘shifting onus’ on the creditor and the 
debtor in a claim for provisional sentence and should the debtor decide to challenge the 
allegation of liability in the provisional sentence summons.156 
Like with the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, the provisional sentence procedure is a 
departure from the ordinary rules of debt enforcement in civil procedure in that a final 
determination of liability occurs after the receipt of the disputed debt by the creditor. The 
theory underlying the provisional sentence procedure ‘is that it is granted on the presumption 
of the genuineness and the legal validity of the documents produced to the Court [and 
provided the Court is] provisionally satisfied that the creditor will succeed in the principal 
suit.’157 Pete et al. state in the book Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide that the purpose of 
the provisional sentence procedure is ‘to provide a… [creditor]… – who, on the face of it, has 
a cast-iron case in that his claim is based on a liquid document – with a short cut to a kind of 
provisional or temporary judgment’ and furthermore ‘[i]t is a speedy procedure, which 
allows… [creditors]… whose claims are based on liquid documents to avoid the more 
lengthy and expensive mechanics of an ordinary trial action’.158 
It is understood that a departure from ordinary civil debt enforcement is justified 
because there is a sense of reassurance that there is a debt and that such debt is legally 
enforceable. The same is true for a fiscal debt. It is presumed that the fiscal debt is due by 
operation of law and that SARS, as an organ of state, correctly administered it in accordance 
with the applicable tax Act. The provisional sentence procedure allows for an expedited debt 
enforcement procedure on the basis that there is a contract.159 Owing to the fact that it can be 
proven that one of the two sources comprising the nature of a contractual debt exists in 
circumstances where there is a valid liquid document and where the court is satisfied that the 
creditor is likely to succeed, on a balance of probabilities, in the principal case a provisional 
judgment is awarded on an accelerated but provisional basis.  
 
                                                 
153 Twee Jonge supra note 21 at para 20. 
154 Pete et al op cit note 144 at 378.  
155 Twee Jonge supra note 21 at para 21. 
156 Pete et al op cit note 143 at page 379 at footnote 68. 
157 Harrowsmith v Ceres Flats (Pty) Ltd 1979 (2) SA 722 (T) at 728C.  
158 Pete et al op cit note 144 at 375.  
159 In the form of a liquid document.  
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 The ‘summary judgment’ procedure 
 
Summary judgment is defined as ‘[a] judgment granted on a claim or defense [sic] about 
which there is no genuine issue of material fact and upon which the movant is entitled to 
prevail as matter of law [and]… it allows the speedy disposition of a controversy without the 
need for trial’.160 It provides a mechanism to ‘short-cut the usual procedures, and obtain 
judgment without having to go to trial’.161 It is available to a creditor who has a ‘clear-cut 
claim’.162 Such a creditor may apply to court for summary judgment provided it is clear that 
the debtor ‘has no valid defence’ to the claim for the payment of a debt and that ‘an 
appearance to defend’ submitted by the debtor was only done for the purposes of delay.163  
Rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court and rule 14 of the Rules Regulating the 
Conduct of the Proceedings of the Magistrates’ Courts of South Africa and enable a creditor 
to apply to court for summary judgment in respect of four categories of claims: a claim based 
on a liquid document; a claim for a liquidated amount in money; a claim for the delivery of 
specified movable property; or a claim for ejectment. All of these indicate a clear-cut claim. 
A summary judgment allows a person to ‘obtain a final judgment when there was no bona 
fide defence to an action’.164 The burden of proof carried by the debtor in the provisional 
sentence procedure is more onerous than in the case of the procedure for summary judgment 
in that ‘[w]ith summary judgment, the defendant has merely to show that he has a prima facie 
defence’.165 With provisional sentence, however, the debtor ‘must show that the probabilities 
are that his defence will be successful’, which is regarded as ‘the normal civil burden of a 
preponderance of probabilities’.166 
The summary judgment procedure is a departure from the ordinary rules of debt 
enforcement in civil procedure in that a final determination of liability does not involve a 
trial, however, the collection of the debt is still permitted. The purpose of the summary 
judgment procedure has been held to be ‘to prevent the… [debtor]… from delaying the 
proceedings when he has no real defence to the [creditor’s] claim’ and to ‘balance two 
conflicting interests’.167 In this regard, Pete et al state in the book Civil Procedure: A 
Practical Guide as follows:  
 
On the one hand, the… [creditor]… should not be forced, in circumstances 
which amount to an abuse of the process of court, to suffer the delay and 
expense of a trial. On the other hand, summary judgment is a severe and 
                                                 
160 Black’s Law Dictionary op cit note 1 at the definition of ‘summary judgment’.  
161 Pete et al op cit note 144 at page 215. 
162 Ibid at page 206. 
163 Ibid at page 206. 
164 Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA) at para 29. 
165 Pete et al op cit note 144 at page 380. 
166 Ibid at page 380; Dickinson v South African General Electric Co. (Pty) Ltd 1973 (2) SA 620 (A) at 630F. 
167 Pete et al op cit note 144 at page 215. 
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extraordinary procedure, which circumvents the audi alteram partem 
principle in that a… [debtor]… who wishes to defend a matter may have 
judgment taken against him without the benefit of a trial … There are several 
provisions in the rules which help to keep these competing interests in 
balance. Summary judgment is a frequently used procedure, and therefore of 
great importance.168 
 
The summary judgment procedure allows for an expedited debt enforcement 
procedure on the basis that there is a contract169 and that the obligations arising therefrom are 
enforceable given that the debtor has no valid defence. Therefore, due the fact that it can be 
proven that the two sources comprising the nature of a contractual debt have been satisfied a 




There are peculiarities of debt enforcement procedure not only specific to fiscal debt, but also 
found with regard to civil debt. The ‘pay now argue later’ principle being the more drastic 
departure in that no recourse to the judiciary is required before the debt collection procedures 
may be invoked,170 unlike the procedure for provisional sentence and summary judgment 
where there is still some recourse to a court of law although not to the same extent as the 
ordinary procedure for debt enforcement in civil procedure, which involves a trial. These 
exceptions provide for accelerated debt enforcement procedures. Lord Hatherley held in John 
Wallingford v The Directors & C. of the Mutual Society171 that:  
 
[T]he objects of these short methods of procedure172 has been to prevent 
unreasonable delay, a delay which was very prejudicial to the creditors, and 
never… can have been very beneficial to the debtor himself. Simply allowing 
legal proceedings to take place, in order that delay may be applied to the 
administration of justice as much as possible, is not an end for which we can 
conceive the Legislature to have framed the provisions which now exist 
under the several Judicature Acts.173 
 
                                                 
168 Pete et al op cit note 144 at page 215. 
169 The four categories of claims mentioned above.  
170 The suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in terms of section 164(2) of the TAA does provide some relief for 
taxpayers, however this is not dealt with in detail in this section of the research.  
171 1880 5 AC 685 (HL).  
172 Reference here was made to summary judgment, however the principle is still applicable to other procedures which 
provide short cuts.  
173 John Wallingford supra note 171 at page 699. 
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The procedures for provisional sentence and summary judgment are justified on the 
basis of expediency and judicial efficiency, and on the basis that the elements of the nature of 
a civil debt can be proved. This can be likened to the need for an effective and efficient fiscal 
administration. SARS must, in terms of section 4(2) of the SARS Act, perform its functions 
in the most cost-efficient and effective manner and in accordance with the values and 
principles contained in the Constitution.174 The SARS Act lists, under section 3 of the SARS 
Act and as an objective of SARS, the ‘efficient and effective… collection of revenue’. SARS 
regards tax revenue as an asset that belongs to South Africa. It is submitted that it is against 
this premise that the method of fiscal debt enforcement employed by SARS, namely, the ‘pay 
now argue later’ principle, exists. This is confirmed in Capstone 556 and Kluh (supra) Binns-
Ward J held that the rationale underlying the ‘pay now argue later’ principle ‘include the 
public interest in obtaining full and speedy settlement of tax debts and the need to limit the 
ability of recalcitrant taxpayers to use objection and appeal procedures strategically to defer 
payment of their taxes’.175 It is submitted that both provisional sentence and summary 
judgment have regard to the merits of the case. In order to avoid provisional sentence being 
granted the debtor has the opportunity to prove that, on a balance of probabilities, that his or 
her defence will be successful.176 In summary judgment, the debtor has to show that he or she 
has a prima facie case in order to avoid summary judgment being award.177 As previously 
mentioned, in Capstone 556 and Kluh it was held that section 164 does indirectly provide for 
the consideration of merits in situations of rejecting or revoking an application for the 
suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle.178 
Interestingly, Mkgoro J observed in Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and 
Another179 that ‘[i]f the debt itself is disputed, the seizure of the property in execution of the 
debt must equally be disputed’.180 Ordinary debt recovery in civil procedure likewise 
necessitates a link between the debt and the liability for the debt; a dispute regarding the 
liability for the debt thus relates to a dispute regarding the collection of the debt. The ‘pay 
now argue later’ principle severs this link, as does the provisional sentence and summary 
judgment procedures, albeit to a lesser degree. The greater the ability to evidence liability for 
the debt without the need for recourse to court processes the more likely that the severing of 
this link would be justified.  
According to Croome ‘[i]f taxpayers enter voluntarily into a relationship with the fisc 
[similar to two contracting parties entering into a contract] there might be some justification 
in arguing that they must simply submit to the Commissioner’s powers and accept that they 
                                                 
174 In terms of section 195 of the Constitution, public administration must be governed by the democratic values and 
principles enshrined in the Constitution, including those specifically mentioned under section 195.  
175 Capstone 556 and Kluh supra note 77 at para 9.  
176 See Pete et al op cit note 144 at 380. 
177 Ibid.  
178 Capstone 556 and Kluh supra note 77 at para 32. 
179 Lesapo supra note 116. 
180 Ibid at para 14. 
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have a few rights’.181 There is merit in an argument that, because a fiscal debt does not arise 
from a voluntary agreement but from the operation of law and the administration by an organ 
of state a limitation of the rights of taxpayers should not be readily condoned. However, it is 
submitted that this is not the rationale underlying the departure from the ordinary procedure 
for debt enforcement in civil procedure. A departure is justified when the liability for the debt 
can be evidenced without the need for fortification through court process, regardless of 
whether the debt was incurred voluntarily or not. With a fiscal debt, the evidence of the 
liability is strong182 in that not only is the debt effected by an organ of state183, which carries 
a greater burden than a civil creditor to ensure that the debt does exist in law and is not 
fraudulent, but also the debt arises by operation of law in terms of a tax Act, and not in terms 
of a unique agreement between persons in the civil or non-State arena, which allows for 
greater interpretation and dispute..184 
Furthermore, it may be noted that, in certain circumstances, ‘the coercive power of the 
state may be invoked without the sanction of a court’.185 This is key to the healthy operation 
of a nation, and is condoned in other settings. For example, the South African Police Service 
has the right to arrest a person and thereafter detain them in legal custody provided such 
person has allegedly committed a crime.186 Therefore, before the accused’s liability has been 
properly ascertained by a court of law, the accused may be arrested and thereafter detained. 














                                                 
181 Croome op cite note 40 at 1. 
182 In provisional sentence and summary judgment procedures the liability can also be easily evidence without the need for 
court process.  
183 In the case Hindry v Nedcor Bank Ltd 1999 (2) SA 757 (W) Wunsh J held, when referring to the purpose for which a 
taxpayer’s rights are limited in circumstances of section 88 and section 99 of the Income Tax Act (now section 164 and 
section 179 of the TAA), that ‘[t]he purpose for which a person’s rights are limited… is... according to the undisputed and 
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184 Ibid at page 63. 
185 Lesapo supra note 116 at para 12. 






5. CHAPTER 5: THE CONSISTENCY OF THE ‘PAY NOW ARGUE 
LATER’ PRINCIPLE WITH SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 
 
The right of access to court is indeed foundational to the stability of an 
orderly society. It ensures the peaceful, regulated and institutionalised 
mechanisms to resolve disputes, without resorting to self help [sic]. The right 
of access to court is a bulwark against vigilantism, and the chaos and anarchy 




Following from Chapter 4, ‘the ordinary way of securing execution in settlement of 
debts due is through the court process’.188 This is a principle of debt recovery which is 
against self-help and is an expression of the constitutional right of access to courts in terms of 
section 34 of the Constitution. Section 34 gives effect to the right of access to courts and 
states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum’. ‘Everyone’ includes a South African 
taxpayer. It is submitted that a ‘dispute that can be resolved by the application of law’ covers 
a dispute regarding the obligation to pay tax for the reason that the meaning of ‘tax’ is 
defined in section 1 of the TAA as ‘a tax, duty, levy, royalty, fee, contribution, penalty, 
interest and any other moneys imposed under a tax Act’. Thus, the liability for tax is directly 
determined by the application of law. A dispute regarding the obligation to pay tax would 
thus involve the application of law and must thus, according to the Constitution, be decided 
in a fair public hearing before a court.  
The ‘pay now argue later’ principle secures debt collection or execution without the 
need for recourse to the court process and thus without access to courts, which, it has been 
argued, borders on self-help and limits a taxpayer’s right of access to courts.189 A taxpayer is 
required to pay the disputed tax debt first, unless SARS agrees to suspend payment under 
section 164 of the TAA, and then later or simultaneously challenge the assessment via the 
dispute resolution process, which may result in the matter being heard by the tax court or a 
higher court. Access to courts prevents so-called self-help. For example, litigation to obtain 
                                                 
187 Lesapo supra note 116 at para 22. 
188 Ibid at para 19.  
189 See Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Another 2000 (2) SA 232 (W). 
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an order for specific performance is a procedural step to obtain the enforcement of a debt and 
is required because persons are not entitled to resort to self-help to obtain what is due to 
them. However, there are exceptions to this, namely, the provisional sentence procedure and 
the summary judgment procedure, which have been argued to restrict access to courts190.  
The overriding principle in constitutional law is that, in terms of section 9(1) of the 
Constitution, everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection of and 
benefit of the law. Therefore, should the ‘pay now argue later’ principle prevent the equal 
protection of the constitutional right of access to court of a person, in their capacity as a 
taxpayer, it will be regarded as unconstitutional unless the infringement on the constitutional 
right can be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
 Treatment of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle by South African courts  
 
The ‘pay now argue later’ principle has not been considered in terms of the section 164 of the 
TAA. This research therefore examines the treatment of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle 
by South African courts contained in section 88 of the Income Tax Act and section 36 of the 
VAT Act. Although the wording in the now repealed section 88 and section 36 were largely 
similar in material respects,191 it is submitted that for the purposes of this research, it is 
beneficial to analyse separately the way in which the South African courts have approached 
or dealt with these two sections in regard to their argued infringement of the right to access to 
courts. 
In the case of The Commissioner of Inland Revenue v NCR Corporation of South 
Africa (Proprietary) Ltd192 the Supreme Court of Appeal decided on the proper interpretation 
of section 88 of the Income Tax Act. The dispute between the then Commissioner: Inland 
Revenue and NCR Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd, that is, the taxpayer, began with 
the Commissioner: Inland Revenue disallowing, in its tax assessment of the taxpayer, a 
deduction of foreign exchange losses incurred by the taxpayer for its 1973, 1974, 1975 and 
1976 years of assessment.193 The taxpayer objected to this disallowance ‘on the ground that 
since the losses had been incurred in the production of income and were not of a capital 
nature they were properly deductible’.194 The Supreme Court decided in favour of the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court of Appeal was 
tasked with interpreting the wording of section 88. For this purpose, Corbett JA divided 
section 88, as it then read, into two portions, as seen below. 
 
                                                 
190 See paragraph 5.5 below.  
191 See Chapter 2 on the development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle.  
192 (unreported case no 5/1988) of 10 March 1988. 
193 Ibid at page 2-3. 
194 Ibid at page 3. 
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The obligation to pay and the right to receive and 
recover any tax chargeable under this Act shall 
not, unless the Commissioner so directs, be 
suspended by any appeal or pending the decision 
of a court of law under section 86 or 86A, but if 
any assessment is altered on appeal or in 
conformity with any such decision a due 
adjustment shall be made, amounts paid in excess 
being refunded with interest at the prescribed rate 
(but subject to the provisions of section 89quin), 
such interest being calculated from the date 
proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to 
be the date on which such excess was received 
and amounts short-paid being recoverable with 
interest calculated as provided in section 89. 
  
The first portion ‘enacts that the 
obligation to pay and the right to receive 
and recover any tax chargeable under the 
[Income Tax] Act is not suspended, 
unless the Commissioner so directs, by 
“any appeal” or “pending the decision of 
a court [of] law under sec 86 or 86A”’.195 
  
‘The second portion provides for the 
refunding of excess tax paid, together 
with interest thereon, whenever an 
assessment is altered “on appeal” or “in 
conformity with any such decision”’.196 
 
Of relevance to this research is the Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the 
first portion of section 88, namely, the non-suspension of the obligation on a taxpayer to pay 
tax. Corbett JA held in this regard that:  
 
The common law rule of practice that generally the execution of a judgment 
is automatically suspended upon the noting of an appeal… could hardly apply 
to an appeal noted to the Special Court against the disallowance of an 
objection to an assessment by the Commissioner… .197 (own emphasis) 
 
It is submitted that Corbett JA considered the first portion of section 88, which is 
primarily responsible for giving effect to the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, as a peculiarity 
which is not governed by the same category of rules regulating civil procedures.198 A similar 
finding in this respect was noted in Metcash (supra). The dispute between Metcash Trading 
Ltd, a registered VAT vendor, and the Commissioner began with the Commissioner 
disallowing, in its tax assessment of the taxpayer, a deduction of input VAT incurred by the 
taxpayer for the period July 1996 to June 1997, on the basis that the transactions giving rise 
to the input VAT relating to ‘alleged divisions’ of Metcash Trading Ltd never occurred.199 In 
response to the tax assessment, which, in turn, automatically brought into operation the ‘pay 
                                                 
195 NCR supra note 192 at page 16.  
196 Ibid at page 16.  
197 Ibid at pages 16-7. 
198 Although explicitly referring to the procedure regulating the execution of a judgment, it is submitted that the same 
reasoning is applicable to the ‘pay now argue later’ principle.  
199 See Olivier op cit note 33 at pages 194-5 which provides a succinct outline of the facts of Metcash supra note 19.  
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now argue later’ principle, Metcash Trading Ltd ‘approached the high court on an urgent 
basis to declare the collections provisions [which include the ‘pay now argue later’ principle 
in terms of section 36] unconstitutional, as they infringe upon a taxpayer’s right to have its 
disputes settled by a court of law’.200 Agreeing with Corbett JA in NCR, Kriegler J held that: 
 
As in the case of section 88 of the Income Tax Act discussed by Corbett 
JA… section 36 is not concerned with an appeal against a judgment, but with 
a statutory form of revision of an administrative decision according to a 
special procedure.201 (own emphasis). 
 
Thus, in both NCR and Metcash it was held that, inter alia, the ordinary rules of civil 
procedure, which, it is submitted, are consistent with the constitutional right of access to 
court202, do not take precedence over the procedure entrenched by the ‘pay now argue later’ 
principle.  
The judgment in NCR took place prior to South Africa’s Constitutional era, which 
begs the question whether this case, which concerned income tax, would have been decided 
differently post Constitution. It is submitted that this question can be answered in the 
negative taking into account that this principle has, subsequent to the Constitution, been 
upheld by the South African courts. In the unreported case of King v The Commissioner for 
the South African Revenue Service (SARS)203, De Vos J held that ‘the principle ‘pay now 
argue later’ was approved as a general principle of our tax system and this is the case in many 
open and democratic societies’204 and further in Capstone 556 and Kluh (supra), Binns-Ward 
J upheld the principle. Furthermore, Arnold, in his Brief for the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue for the Republic of South Africa, in referring to section 88 of the Income Tax Act, 
stated that ‘this provision is both reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society’ and ‘that 
requiring taxpayers to pay taxes under dispute does not negate any fundamental rights’.205 
Besides the finding above that the ‘pay now argue later’ principle is a ‘special 
procedure’ which warrants exception of ordinary debt enforcement in civil procedure, it has 
been held that the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in terms of section 36 ‘is not concerned 
with access to a court of law and says nothing that can be construed as a prohibition against 
resort to such a court’ and thus ‘[i]t does not afford any authority to circumvent the courts, 
nor any right to levy execution’.206 Kriegler J, in referring to the first portion of section 36, 
which, it is submitted, corresponds to the first portion of section 88 referred to by Corbett JA 
                                                 
200 Olivier op cit note 33 at page 195. 
201 Metcash supra note 19 at para 36.  
202 Please see Chapter 4.  
203 (unreported case no 12508/02) of 14 May 2002. 
204 Ibid at page 8. 
205 Arnold op cit note 82 at pages 21-2.  
206 Metcash supra note 19 at para 36-7.  
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in NCR, held that ‘[t]he first part of the section is simply not concerned with anything other 
than the non-suspension – notwithstanding demur – of the obligation to pay the assessed 
VAT and consequential imposts chargeable under the Act.’207 It is submitted, however, that 
the ‘pay now argue later’ principle circumvents access to courts at the time that the principle 
is in operation, that is, upon the payment of tax becoming due by a taxpayer. The 
determination as to whether this principle infringes the right of access to courts turns on, it is 
submitted, whether the principle ‘excludes the jurisdiction of the courts at the time it is 
invoked’.208 According to Olivier, ‘at the time of payment a taxpayer has no access to a court 
of law apart from on narrow [judicial] review grounds’.209 Therefore it is not relevant 
whether the ‘pay now argue later’ principle specifically refers to anything which can be 
construed as a prohibition against access to courts, it matters whether at the time the principle 
is invoked the access to courts remains intact. Furthermore, the debt collection procedures in 
the TAA, specifically refer to the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in section 164. Therefore, it 
is difficult to argue that the ‘pay now argue later’ principle does not, as it currently exists, 
‘circumvent the courts, nor any right to levy execution’210. 
The ‘pay now argue later’ principle appears to have been treated as an extraordinary 
or ‘special procedure’ which requires a departure from the normal rules of civil procedure, 
like certain debt enforcement procedures in civil procedure do. This results, it is submitted, in 
an infringement of the right of access to courts, but a justifiable infringement, as is more fully 
set out below.  
 
 Justifiable limitation of the constitutional right of access to courts by the ‘pay 
now argue later’ principle  
 
S 36(2) of the Constitution states that ‘[e]xcept as provided in subsection [36](1) or in any 
other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights’. Section 36(1) of the Constitution states that:  
 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including–  
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
                                                 
207 Metcash supra note 19 at para 37. 
208 Olivier op cit note 33 at page 196. 
209 Ibid at page 196. 
210 Metcash supra note 19 at para 36-7.  
64 
 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
Professor Henry Vorster stated, in a case note on Metcash, that, with regard to section 
36 of the VAT Act and its limitation on the constitutional right of access to court, ‘the 
limitation is justifiable in terms of s 36… [as it]… is limited in scope, temporary and subject 
to judicial review’ and, furthermore, ‘[t]he public interest in obtaining full and speedy 
settlement of tax debts is significant’.211 He stated further that: 
 
In order for the rule to work it is necessary to obtain execution against a 
taxpayer without having first to air the subject matter of the objection. Given 
the prevalence of the rule in other jurisdictions, it is one which is accepted as 
reasonable in open and democratic societies as required by s 36 of the 
Constitution. Finally, the effect of the rule on individual taxpayers is 
ameliorated by the power conferred upon the Commissioner to suspend its 
operation. The existence of this discretion limits the effect of the rule in an 
appropriate manner.212 
 
It is submitted that the limitation created by the ‘pay now argue later’ principle is justifiable 
in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. Just like the need exists for exceptions to debt 
recovery in civil procedure, likewise the need exists in tax administrative law. According to 
Arnold in the Brief for the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Republic of South Africa, 
‘it would not be sensible to eliminate the requirement for taxpayers to pay taxes owing 
despite disputing the payment of such taxes in the courts’ for the reasons that ‘[i]f taxes under 
dispute do not have to be paid by taxpayers, there is a clear incentive for taxpayers to dispute 
tax assessments that they would not otherwise dispute’ and ‘[i]t is very difficult for the courts 
or the tax authorities to decide whether or not disputes are frivolous’.213 Furthermore, ‘[i]f 
taxes are not paid when assessed, there is also the problem of the taxpayer’s not having the 
necessary funds to pay the taxes when the litigation is finally resolved and the taxes are found 
to be due and payable’.214 
 
 VAT versus income tax: Is a different application for each tax type warranted? 
 
Kriegler J made important points in Metcash regarding the difference between VAT and 
income tax, namely that:   
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Unlike income tax, where assessments can elicit genuine differences of 
opinion about accounting practice, legal interpretations or the like, in the case 
of a VAT assessment there must invariably have been an adverse credibility 
finding by the Commissioner; and by like token such a finding would usually 
have entailed a rejection of the truth of the vendor’s records, returns and 
averments relating thereto. Consequently the discharge of the onus is a most 
formidable hurdle facing a VAT vendor who is aggrieved by an assessment: 
unless the Commissioner’s precipitating credibility finding can be shown to 
be wrong, the consequential assessment must stand.215 
 
The finding in Metcash that section 36 of the VAT Act does not infringe the 
constitutional right of access to courts may thus not be applicable to income tax. VAT is, 
according to Kriegler J, simpler to assess in that it is based on a more ‘predictable stream of 
revenue’.216 A simpler form of tax may result in an less vexatious or shortened dispute. 
However, it is submitted that this does not necessarily mean that taxpayer involved in a 
dispute regarding VAT should not be afforded the same access to courts as a taxpayer 
involved in a disputed regarding income tax. As mentioned above, a departure from debt 
enforcement procedures in civil procedure is justified when the liability for the debt can be 
evidenced without the need for fortification through court process, regardless of whether the 
debt was incurred voluntarily or not. With a fiscal debt arising in terms of the VAT Act the 
debt can be easily evidenced, which is not so with a fiscal debt arising in terms of income tax. 
VAT is different as vendor collect VAT from purchasers of its goods and is liable to pay that 
to SARS, whereas income tax is due on the taxable income at the end of the year. Therefore, 
there is merit in a distinction between VAT and income tax when it comes to the applicability 
of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle.  
 
 Treatment of civil debt enforcement procedures by South African courts 
 
In Twee Jonge (supra), the Constitutional Court decided on whether the provisional sentence 
procedure unjustifiably limits the constitutionally protected right of access to courts. 
Provisional sentence, as discussed more fully above, is a civil debt enforcement procedure 
and allows a creditor to claim full and immediate payment of a debt, more specifically the 
payment of the provisional judgment debt of the provisional sentence, prior to any final 
judgment being made by the court regarding the liability for the alleged debt.217 In Twee 
Jonge, the Constitutional Court decided on an application for an order declaring that the 
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procedure for provisional sentence is inconsistent with the Constitution, specifically with the 
constitutional right to a fair hearing218 and the constitutional right to equality before the 
law,219 insofar as it discriminates against alleged debtors who can provide payment of the 
amount of the judgment of the provisional sentence debt, restricting them from entering into 
the principal case regarding liability.220 It was held that the procedure for provisional 
sentence was inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it does not give 
courts the discretion to refuse provisional sentence in certain limited circumstances.221  
In contrast to the above finding in Twee Jonge, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Joob 
Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture222 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal expressed a different reasoning with regard to the summary judgment procedure. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal decided on an application for summary judgment, specifically 
dealing with the allegation that ‘summary judgment is a remedy of an ‘extraordinary and 
drastic nature’, based on ‘the supposition that the… [creditor’s]… case is unimpeachable and 
the [debtor’s] defence is bogus or bad in law’’.223 The Supreme Court of Appeal refuted the 
above allegation by finding that ‘summary judgment proceedings only hold terrors and are 
‘drastic’ for a… [debtor] who has no defence’.224 Navsa JA held that ‘the summary judgment 
procedure was not intended to ‘shut… [a debtor]… out from defending’, unless it was very 
clear indeed that he had no case in the action [but was] intended to prevent sham defences 
from defeating the rights of parties by delay, and at the same time causing great loss to… 
[creditors]… who were endeavouring to enforce their rights’.225  
Interestingly, the reasoning applied by Navsa JA in Joob Joob was that the summary 
judgment procedure ‘is not intended to deprive a… [debtor]… with a triable issue or a 
sustainable defence of her/his day in court’226, is similar to that applied by Kriegler J in 
Metcash that the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in terms of section 36 ‘says nothing that can 
be construed as a prohibition against resort to such a court’.227 A test of the constitutionality 
of the provisions228 should not, it is submitted, take the form of a subjective test of what was 
intended or what is read by the provisions, but instead should consider the objective impact of 
the provisions. Following such an approach it is difficult to refute that the ‘pay now argue 
later’ principle ‘excludes the jurisdiction of the courts at the time it is invoked’.229 
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Van Heerden stated that:  
 
By its nature the levying of tax is an invasion of rights of the citizen. On the 
other hand, the very existence of the state and its institutions is dependent on 
funds obtained by way of taxes. Tax must be collected, but in accordance 
with the Constitution as the supreme law.230 
 
Van Heerden summarised the situation well in that there is a definite balancing of the 
rights involved when it comes to revenue enforcement and collection. To be ‘in accordance 
with the Constitution as the supreme law’ provides for a situation in which there may be a 
justifiable limitation of a constitutional right. Thus, the ‘pay now argue later’ principle does 
limit a taxpayer’s right of access to courts at the time that the tax becomes due. However, this 
limitation is justified. In Giddey NO v JC Barnard and Partners231 O’Regan J held that:  
 
But for courts to function fairly, they must have rules that regulate their 
proceedings. Those rules will often require parties to take certain steps on 
pain of being prevented from proceeding with a claim or defence. A common 
example is the rule regulating the notice of bar in terms of which … 
[debtors]… may be called upon to lodge their plea within a certain time 
failing which they will lose the right to raise their defence. Many of the rules 
of court require compliance with fixed time limits, and a failure to observe 
those time limits may result, in the absence of good cause shown, in a … 
[creditor]… or … [debtor]… being prevented from pursuing their claim or 
defence. Of course, all these rules must be compliant with the Constitution.232 
 
Similarly, to the need for regulatory rules ‘for courts to function fairly’, the fiscus also 
requires such rules to function efficiently and effectively. This, it is submitted, provides 
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6. CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
We have fought for so long that we cannot even remember what we 
are fighting for.233 
 
 Introduction  
 
As has been previously mentioned in the preceding chapters, the significance of this research 
lies in expanding on existing analyses of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle by not only 
testing its consistency with the Constitution, but also comparing it to broader debt 
enforcement in civil procedure. This research has analysed the ‘pay now argue later’ principle 
and has asked and answered questions about its development, operation, comparability to 
civil debt procedures and consistency with the Constitution. All of these components are 
important to an in-depth analysis of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle in South African tax 
law as well as being important for determining whether this principle is an anomaly in the 
context of broader debt recovery in South Africa. 
 
 Specific answers to the research questions 
 
How has the ‘pay now argue later’ principle developed from its first appearance in the 
Income Tax Act and the VAT Act to the TAB and, finally, to the TAA, and what was the 
nature of the developments? The development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle from its 
first appearance in the Income Tax Act in 1962 and the VAT Act in 1993 until their repeal in 
2011 was relatively minor save for in the year 2009, during which year there was a marked 
change in the structure of this principle, with the inclusion of the suspension rule. Following 
this amendment in 2009, the ‘pay now argue later’ principle substantially maintained its 
form, save for a few key amendments, during its incorporation into the TAB and, later, into 
the TAA. 
What was the effect, if any, of the advent of the Constitutional era on the 
development of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle? The dawn of the constitutional era in 
South Africa accompanied by increased recognition of taxpayers’ rights, nationally and 
internationally, has, interestingly, not affected the development of the ‘pay now argue later’ 
principle in South Africa to any substantial degree. This has been so despite constitutional 
                                                 




challenges taken against the principle. The success of these constitutional challenges indicate 
that, should the application by van Heerden234 have been heard by the Constitutional Court, 
the principle would have remained as is.  
How is an application to suspend the obligation to pay tax brought by a taxpayer in 
terms of the TAA? In practice, a request by a taxpayer for the suspension of the obligation to 
pay tax due under an assessment takes the form of a letter setting out such taxpayer’s 
compliance with the criteria identified in section 164. Currently, there is no prescribed form 
for such an application and it is not possible to submit a request for suspension via eFiling. 
What is the meaning and scope of the Commissioner’s ‘discretion’ when approving 
or refusing an application for the suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle? There 
is no case law or guidance from the legislature or SARS as to the nature of the list of 
‘relevant factors’ provided in section 164(3), namely, whether the list of factors is exhaustive 
and the importance that should be placed on the different factors. As confirmed by Croome & 
Olivier’s interpretation of the provision, ‘SARS needs to consider the factors stated in s 164 
and may also take account of other factors which are not stated in the section’.235 They go 
further to state that ‘[t]his flows from the use of the word ‘including’’ in the section.236 It is 
submitted that it is unlikely that a senior SARS official would be limited to the factors listed 
in section 164(3), as such an interpretation would curtail the discretion of a senior SARS 
official in making a decision whether to accept an application for the suspension of the ‘pay 
now argue later’ principle, and should the legislature had intended such an interpretation it 
would have been made clearer in the section itself. Furthermore, the Memorandum on the 
Objects of the Taxation Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2014 specifically explains 
that the criteria listed in section 164(3) must be considered in addition to relevant factors.  
What, if any, are the remedies available to a taxpayer whose application for the 
suspension of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle has been refused and are they sufficient? 
Section 164 does not provide for a procedure in terms of which a taxpayer may object or 
appeal against the decision of a senior SARS official to reject an application for the 
suspension of the payment of tax, or for a procedure in terms of which the taxpayer may 
request that such senior SARS official provide reasons for such a decision. However, PAJA 
does make provision for a remedy for the taxpayer in such circumstances in the form of a 
judicial review. This has, as mentioned above, been regarded as an insufficient remedy for 
taxpayers.237  
How does the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, as a fiscal debt enforcement 
procedure, compare with ordinary civil debt enforcement in South Africa? It is submitted 
that the ‘pay now argue later’ principle is a sui generis debt enforcement procedure in that it 
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does not take the form of litigation, which is characteristic of ordinary civil debt enforcement, 
but instead occurs automatically by operation of law. This brings about a departure from the 
ordinary sequence of events in debt recovery in civil procedure. Should the taxpayer dispute 
the liability for a fiscal debt, this is dealt with separately and is removed from the fiscal debt 
recovery process. As stated above, ‘the ordinary way of securing execution in settlement of 
debts due is through the court process’.238 However, the ‘pay now argue later’ principle 
secures debt collection without the need for recourse to the judiciary. Therefore, on the face 
of it, the ‘pay now argue later’ principle is an unusual and peculiar departure from the normal 
rules regulating debt enforcement procedures. 
Is the rationale underlying the ‘pay now argue later’ principle consistent with 
exceptions to ordinary civil debt enforcement in South Africa, that is provisional sentence 
and summary judgment? It is submitted that the procedures for provisional sentence and 
summary judgment are justified on the basis of expediency and judicial efficiency, and on the 
basis that the elements of the nature of a civil debt can be proved. This can be likened to the 
need for an effective and efficient fiscal administration. It is submitted that ordinary debt 
recovery in civil procedure necessitates that there be a link between the debt and the liability 
for the debt; a dispute over the liability for the debt thus relates to a dispute over the 
collection of the debt. The ‘pay now argue later’ principle severs this link, as do the 
provisional sentence and summary judgment procedures, albeit to a lesser degree. The greater 
the ability to evidence liability for the debt without the need for recourse to court processes, 
the more likely it is that the severing of this link would be justified. With a fiscal debt, the 
evidence of the liability is strong239 in that not only is the debt effected by an organ of state, 
which carries a greater burden than a civil person to ensure that the debt does indeed exist in 
law and is not fraudulent, but also the debt arises by operation of law in terms of a tax Act, 
and not in terms of a unique agreement between two or more civil persons, which allows for 
greater interpretation and dispute.  
Are the provisions of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle consistent with the 
constitutional right of access to courts; if not, then is a limitation on the constitutional 
right of access to courts justified? The ‘pay now argue later’ principle limits a taxpayer’s 
right of access to courts at the time that the tax becomes due. However, this limitation is 
justified, taking into account the factors of section 36 of the Constitution.  
Should the ‘pay now argue later’ principle have different applications for VAT and 
income tax disputes? As mentioned above, a departure from debt enforcement procedures in 
civil procedure is justified when the liability for the debt can be evidenced without the need 
for fortification through the court process, regardless of whether the debt was incurred 
voluntarily or not. With a fiscal debt arising in terms of VAT the debt can be easily 
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evidenced, but this is not the case with a fiscal debt arising in terms of income tax. Therefore, 
there is merit in a distinction between VAT and income tax when it comes to the applicability 




This research is by no means meant to laud fiscal debt enforcement and collection procedures 
for their alignment with need and logic; neither is it meant to encourage a revolt by South 
African taxpayers against their obligation to pay tax in situations where the tax is disputed, 
but is instead a means of showing that the ‘pay now argue later’ principle is not a peculiarity 
in broader debt enforcement in South Africa. It is submitted that an appropriate statement to 
conclude this research is that ‘[w]e have fought for so long that we cannot even remember 
what we are fighting for’.240 Other exceptions to the ordinary procedure for civil debt 
enforcement have underlying rationales similar to that underlying the ‘pay now argue later’ 
principle, and result in similar restrictions for the sake of expediency when debt is easily 
evidenced. Furthermore, the ‘pay now argue later’ principle241 and the other exceptions to the 
ordinary procedure for civil debt enforcement have been found to be constitutional.242 By 
way of a brief comparison, Canadian tax law does not have a comparable ‘pay now argue 
later’ principle243, whereas Australian tax law does244. Therefore, although it may not be the 
norm in international tax debt enforcement, it is not abnormal in debt enforcement procedure 
in South Africa. The ‘pay now argue later’ principle is more severe than other civil debt 
enforcement procedures; however, this, it is submitted, is justified in that a party to the debt 
collection is an organ of state, which carries a greater burden than a civil person to ensure that 
the debt does indeed exist in law and is not fraudulent. Similar allowances are made, for 
example and as referred to above, for the South African Police Service, which has the right to 
arrest a person and thereafter detain them in legal custody provided such person has allegedly 
committed a crime.245 Therefore, before the accused’s liability has been properly ascertained 
by a court of law, the accused may be arrested and thereafter detained. 
As a departing remark, it is possible that further inroads into the scope of the power of 
the fiscus in terms of the ‘pay now argue later’ may be made, the suspension rule being one 
such reduction. For example, a compromise that could be made is that ‘it might be 
appropriate to provide taxpayers with a right of appeal if the Commissioner decides not to 
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exercise his discretion’.246 Furthermore, in the court a quo in Metcash (supra), Snyder J 
proffered, as possible alternatives to the ‘pay now argue later’ principle, ‘[h]igher penalties 
… the furnishing of security, even higher interest rates or time-linked penalties’.247 However, 
this has not been dealt with in detail for the purposes of this research as it lies beyond its 
scope.  
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Extract from the TAA  
 
164. Payment of tax pending objection or appeal.— 
 
(1) Unless a senior SARS official otherwise directs in terms of subsection (3)— 
(a) the obligation to pay tax; and 
(b) the right of SARS to receive and recover tax, 
will not be suspended by an objection or appeal or pending the decision of a court of law 
pursuant to an appeal under section 133. 
 
(2) A taxpayer may request a senior SARS official to suspend the payment of tax or a portion 
thereof due under an assessment if the taxpayer intends to dispute or disputes the liability 
to pay that tax under Chapter 9. 
 
(3) A senior SARS official may suspend payment of the disputed tax or a portion thereof 
having regard to relevant factors, including— 
(a) whether the recovery of the disputed tax will be in jeopardy or there will be a risk of 
dissipation of assets; 
(b) the compliance history of the taxpayer with SARS; 
(c) whether fraud is prima facie involved in the origin of the dispute; 
(d) whether payment will result in irreparable hardship to the taxpayer not justified by 
the prejudice to SARS or the fiscus if the disputed tax is not paid or recovered; or 
(e) whether the taxpayer has tendered adequate security for the payment of the disputed 
tax and accepting it is in the interest of SARS or the fiscus. 
 
(4) If payment of tax was suspended under subsection (3) and subsequently— 
(a) no objection is lodged; 
(b) an objection is disallowed and no appeal is lodged; or 
(c) an appeal to the tax board or court is unsuccessful and no further appeal is noted, 
the suspension is revoked with immediate effect from the date of the expiry of the 





(5) A senior SARS official may deny a request in terms of subsection (2) or revoke a decision 
to suspend payment in terms of subsection (3) with immediate effect if satisfied that— 
(a) after the lodging of the objection or appeal, the objection or appeal is frivolous or 
vexatious; 
(b) the taxpayer is employing dilatory tactics in conducting the objection or appeal; 
(c) on further consideration of the factors referred to in subsection (3), the suspension 
should not have been given; or 
(d) there is a material change in any of the factors referred to in subsection (3), upon 
which the decision to suspend payment of the amount involved was based. 
 
(6) During the period commencing on the day that— 
(a) SARS receives a request for suspension under subsection (2); or 
(b) a suspension is revoked under subsection (5), 
(c) and ending 10 business days after notice of SARS’ decision or revocation has been 
issued to the taxpayer, no recovery proceedings may be taken unless SARS has a 
reasonable belief that there is a risk of dissipation of assets by the person concerned. 
 
(7) If an assessment or a decision referred to in section 104 (2) is altered in accordance 
with— 
(a) an objection or appeal; 
(b) a decision of a court of law pursuant to an appeal under section 133; or 
(c) a decision by SARS to concede the appeal to the tax board or the tax court or other 
court of law, 
a due adjustment must be made, amounts paid in excess refunded with interest at the 
prescribed rate, the interest being calculated from the date that excess was received by 
SARS to the date the refunded tax is paid, and amounts short-paid are recoverable with 
interest calculated as provided in section 187 (1). 
 
(8) The provisions of section 191 apply with the necessary changes in respect of an amount 
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